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ABSTRACT 
Considerable analytic effort has been expended explaining the Japanese government’s 
economic and industrial policy formation processes.  These theories, however, have 
seldom been applied to defense policy.  This thesis tests the applicability of these 
theories, notably the plan-rational and principal-agent models, to the relationship between 
bureaucrats, the Diet, and the Cabinet during defense policy formation.  The interaction 
between these three groups and the applicability of these two models are analyzed in case 
studies on Japan’s ballistic missile defense program and the relocation of Marine Corps 
Air Station Futenma.  Both these case studies indicate that bureaucrats hold a subordinate 
position to both the Diet and Cabinet.  Consequently, the plan-rational model appears to 
have little utility when it is applied to defense policy, but a revised principal-agent model 
may be applicable.   
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I. JAPANESE POLICY FORMATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
While thousands of pages have been written about public policy formation in 
Japan, very few of them specifically examine national security decisions.  
Understandably, much of the policy formation literature focuses on economic, trade, and 
industrial policy, but understanding Japanese defense decisions, in particular, will 
become ever more important as Tokyo increasingly asserts itself internationally.  This 
thesis seeks to partially bridge this gap by examining the applicability of a specific subset 
of these theories to defense policy. 
Unfortunately, there is little consensus among the different theories of Japanese 
policy formation.  Explanations run the gamut from the plan-rational model where 
bureaucrats are the powerbrokers to the principal-agent model where politicians rule.  
While these theories tend to mark the boundaries of the debate, numerous variations and 
composites have been proposed, each with its own formula for assigning policy-making 
power.  While it is reasonable to assume one or more of these models will describe the 
national security establishment, defense-specific sensitivities could preclude their utility.  
Consequently, these theories must be tested against a comprehensive set of defense 
policies before accepting their applicability.  While far from comprehensive, this thesis 
will use two case studies focused on the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians 
in order to make a tentative determination on the effectiveness of existing policy 
formation theories to national security. 
This thesis is divided into four chapters.  The first will lay the groundwork for 
analyzing defense policy formation.  It will describe how the Japanese government is 
organized on paper, explain theories of how it works in reality, and then briefly describe 
the organization of the Ministry of Defense in particular.  The second chapter is a case 
study on Japan’s participation with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD).  
This case study highlights how the bureaucracy and political leadership formulate policy 
on a relatively uncontroversial and highly technical program.  The third chapter is a case 
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study on the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, emphasizing the 
actions taken by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  This is instructive since it is the 
only complete case study on the DPJ government so far, highlights policy formation on 
an extremely contentious topic, and shows an active effort on behalf of the political 
leadership to change policy formation processes throughout the Japanese government. 
The conclusion will demonstrate that in these two case studies politicians hold a 
superior, if not dominant, position in defense policy formation.  Consequently, the plan-
rational model is not a useful theory when analyzing the defense establishment.  
Additionally, while the principal-agent model appears to be more applicable, these case 
studies indicate it will need to be modified to incorporate the peculiarities of Japanese 
defense policy.  
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 
1. Organization of the Bureaucracy 
Key aspects of Japanese policy formation theories are based on the incentives 
bureaucrats face due to their own career progression or how the bureaucracy is organized.  
Consequently, a brief description of both will be necessary before describing the policy 
formation theories.  
a. Organization of the Ministries 
Japanese ministries are organized in a hierarchical structure.  The lowest 
level of organization is the section and is composed of between 20 to 30 personnel.  
Above the sections are the departments, which are then organized into bureaus.  Bureaus 
are the highest sub-ministerial bureaucratic organization and each ministry may contain 
anywhere from six to 12 of them.1  The head of each ministry is a politically appointed 
cabinet member, or minister, who typically only holds his or her position for a short 
period.  Below the minister are the administrative vice minister and the parliamentary 
                                                 
1  T. J. Pempel and Michio Muramatsu, "The Japanese Bureaucracy and Economic Development: 
Structuring a Proactive Civil Service," in The Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development: 
Catalysts of Change, ed. Hyung-ki Kim, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43. 
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vice minister.  The administrative vice minister is the most senior bureaucrat in the 
ministry, often having 25 or more years of experience.2  The parliamentary vice-minister 
is a political appointee who traditionally possesses minimal power.3  As part of the 
governmental reforms implemented in 2001, the number of political appointees in each 
ministry increased to approximately six, but the fundamental structure remained 
unchanged.4 
Numerous efforts have attempted to increase the number or power of 
political appointees in each ministry; however, this basic organization has held firm for 
much of the post-war period and was dominant during the creation of most Japanese 
policy formation theories.  The significant reforms enacted under Prime Minister 
Hashimoto are discussed below and the current reform efforts by the DPJ are discussed in 
the Futenma case study. 
Additionally, bureaucracies should not be seen as monolithic entities.  
Frequently, different bureaus within one ministry would promote different policy 
positions.  This will become apparent in the BMD case study, where those ministries that 
could have most forcefully opposed the program were unable to create a unified position.  
b. Bureaucratic Careers 
Becoming a bureaucrat in Japan is highly competitive but largely 
perceived to be based on merit.  Traditionally, most successful applicants graduated with 
a law degree from the University of Tokyo, although that is not a formal requirement.  
Aspiring bureaucrats must take a civil service exam and only a small percentage of those 
applicants will be selected for interviews.5  Those fortunate enough to be hired begin a 
                                                 
2 Pempel and Muramatsu, “Japanese,” 37–38. 
3  John C. Campbell, "Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan," in Democracy in Japan, ed. Takeshi 
Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 116–117. 
4 T. J. Pempel, "Learning to Lose is for Losers: The Japanese LDP’s Reform Struggle," in Political 
Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose, ed. Joseph Wong and Edward Friedman 
(London: Routledge, 2008). 122. 
5 The Japanese civil service administers three classes of exams for various levels of bureaucratic jobs.  
Those applicants aspiring to the elite levels of the bureaucracy must take the Class I exams (Pempel and 
Muramatsu, “Japanese Bureaucracy,” 43). 
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five to ten year training period.  During this time they rotate among various bureaus, 
sometimes briefly to other ministries or overseas, and undergo formal instruction in order 
to broaden their experience. This process is an intentional outgrowth of the Japanese 
preference for generalists over specialists. With only a few exceptions specialists are 
barred from senior bureaucratic positions.6   
Seniority is a primary concern in personnel decisions and bureaucrats will 
never be placed in positions over those senior to them.  Dramatically, this means that 
when a new administrative vice minister is appointed everyone of equal or greater 
seniority retires so that he or she will become the most senior member of the ministry.7  
Retirement, however, is usually not unpleasant for bureaucrats as it happens at the around 
age 50 and usually results in a lucrative second career in business.  These well-paying 
private sector jobs help mitigate the relatively low wages they received during their time 
in the civil service.  Furthermore, ministries typically assist their retiring bureaucrats in 
finding second jobs.  This process has become known as amakudari or ‘descent from 
heaven.’8  Often retired civil servants pursue political careers instead of business.  In fact, 
many post-war Prime Ministers were retired bureaucrats.9 
2. Organization of Political Parties 
Political parties form the second leg in the government’s policy formation 
structure.  While these are not governmental organizations per se, their membership fills 
the seats in the Diet and Cabinet.  Since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in 
power continuously from 1955 to 2009 with only a brief interregnum in the early 1990s 
considerable academic effort has been expended analyzing its processes.  While some 
doubt exists as to the current applicability of past work on the LDP it will be necessary 
and useful to briefly explain its origins and traditional policy procedures.  The 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is a relative upstart.  Consequently, considerably less 
                                                 
6 Campbell, “Democracy,” 117–120. 
7 Ibid., 118–119. 
8 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 63–65. 
9 Campbell, “Democracy,” 119. 
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academic writing exists on this party and its policy procedures are not yet solidified.  This 
section will briefly describe the DPJ’s objectives in reforming the policy-making process 
but will discuss its implementation in the Futenma case study. 
a. The Liberal Democratic Party 
Aside from a brief interruption following the 1993 elections, the LDP 
maintained uninterrupted power from 1955 to 2009.  Consequently, its techniques of 
maintaining power, creating policy, and working with the various parts of government 
have been well documented.  Two aspects of the LDP’s policy formation processes are 
particularly relevant to this thesis and must be briefly described. 
(1) Zoku.  Loosely translated as “family” or “tribes,” zoku are 
informal organizations composed of members of the Diet who possess superior 
knowledge in a specific policy area.10  These politicians typically staff the applicable 
portion of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) where they can exert significant 
influence on their policy niche.11  While a defense policy zoku exists, it is typically 
amongst the smallest.  For example, in 1990, there was only one LDP Diet member in the 
defense zoku who also held a committee membership.  In the same year the finance, 
commerce, and construction zoku each had eight members on committees.12  This lack of 
interest and expertise likely prevents the Diet from asserting itself too forcefully in 
defense policy formation and may partially explain its apparent passivity in the BMD 
case study.  
(2) Policy Affairs Research Council. The PARC is an extensive 
policy formulating organization within the LDP.  It is subdivided into multiple 
functionally separate policy committees that mirror the organization of the Japanese 
                                                 
10  Bradley Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 55. 
11  Leonard J. Schoppa, "Zoku Power and LDP Power: A Case Study of the Zoku Role in Education 
Policy," Journal of Japanese Studies 17, no. 1 (Winter 1991), 82–83, http://www.jstor.org/stable/132908. 
12 Since zoku are informal organizations without official memberships, observers must use their own 
definitions to determine who belongs to one.  Richardson’s definition is more stringent than most authors 
resulting in numbers that are arguably too low.  These numbers are sufficient here, however, to illustrate 
the disparity between defense and other policy areas (Richardson, Japanese, 56). 
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government.13  When the LDP was in power all legislation had to be approved by the 
PARC before it moved to a vote in the Diet.  This effectively allowed the PARC to hold a 
veto on any proposed legislation.14  Likewise, any intra-party dissension was intended to 
be resolved within the PARC, which allowed the disparate elements of the LDP to act 
like “a disciplined corporate unit within the Diet.”15  As a result, this became the venue in 
which bureaucrats and party members negotiated legislation.16  This authority made the 
PARC the de facto power center for policy formation within the LDP and could only be 
overruled by a very select group of party leaders or the party executive council.17 
b. The Democratic Party of Japan 
Little can be said for certain about the DPJ’s internal policy formation 
procedures.  Since mid-2009, the DPJ has undergone several different policy-making 
structures with the goal of concentrating power in the party leadership.  Internal to the 
DPJ, the leadership has devised rules that limit the power of junior members.  Similarly, 
upon assuming power in September 2009, the DPJ has sought to undermine the power of 
the bureaucracy and concentrate it in the Cabinet.  Both of these themes will be explored 
at length in the Futenma case study. 
c. Other Japanese Parties 
The Japanese Diet also contains other parties like the Komeito, the Japan 
Communist Party (JCP), and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).  These 
parties, however, tend to only hold a few seats and aside from a few notable instances 
where they were required for coalitions have exerted little influence on policy formation.  
Consequently, elaborating these parties’ internal policy processes is not necessary for this 
thesis. 
                                                 
13 Richardson, Japanese, 50–51. 
14 Aurelia George Mulgan, "Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis 
Economy," Government and Opposition 38, no. 1 (January 2003): doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.t01-1-00005. 
77. 
15 Richardson, Japanese, 69. 
16 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 83. 
17 Richardson, Japanese, 69. 
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3. Organization of the Executive 
The third leg of the government’s policy formation structure is the executive.  
This segment of the government is composed of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the 
Cabinet Office, and the Cabinet Secretariat. 
a. Strengthening the Executive  
For most of the post-war period, the Japanese Prime Minister has been 
politically weak, especially in comparison to his international peers.18  In fact, for much 
of this period the Prime Minister did not even have explicit authority to introduce bills to 
the Diet, relying on surrogates instead.19  This began to change in the 1990s, however, 
after Japan suffered a series of embarrassments, highlighting the need for a more 
effective and decisive executive.20  The result was the 1999 passage of the Law to 
Amend the Cabinet Law and the Law to Establish the Cabinet Office.  Both laws went 
into effect in 2001.21 
Most observers believe this reorganization helped strengthen the executive 
over both the bureaucracy and the political parties, although the degree to which it has is 
still debated.22  Among other changes, the Prime Minister gained explicit legal 
authorization to propose legislation to the Diet.23  Furthermore, the number of political 
appointees in each ministry increased, some aspects of bureaucratic authority were 
curtailed, the Cabinet Office was created, and Cabinet Secretariat was strengthened.24 
                                                 
18 Campbell, “Democracy,” 123. 
19 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 85. 
20  Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs 
(Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2007). 63-64. 
21 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 87. 
22  Pempel, "Learning,” 122. 
23 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 87. 
24 Pempel, “Learning,” 122. 
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b. The Cabinet Secretariat 
The authority of the Cabinet Secretariat dramatically grew in 2001 when it 
became “an organ of the Cabinet,” responsible for policy “coordination at the highest 
level.”25  Due the reorganization, the Cabinet Secretariat grew from a paltry 184 
personnel in 1999 to more than 700 in 2008.26  Significantly, much of the motivation for 
increasing the permanent staff of the Cabinet Secretariat was to prevent it from being 
dominated by personnel “seconded” from the various ministries whose primary loyalty 
lay with their parent bureaucracy.27 
The Cabinet Secretariat is lead by the Chief Cabinet Secretary.  This is a 
ministerial level political appointment and effectively second only to the Prime Minister, 
combining roughly the same powers and responsibilities as the American Vice President, 
Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, and spokesman.  Given this wide range of 
roles, the Chief Cabinet Secretary is in a position to exert significant influence on any 
policy area including defense.28  Indeed, the influence of the Chief Cabinet Secretary was 
key to advancing the BMD program in the late 1990s.  Likewise, an ineffective Chief 
Cabinet Secretary contributed to the DPJ’s fiasco over Futenma. 
Several other personnel influence defense policy.  These include the 
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration, who is the nominal head of the 
national bureaucracy, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, 
Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management, and the 
Director of National Intelligence.  Additionally, one of the five Special Advisors to the 
Prime Minister is dedicated to defense policy.29 
                                                 
25 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 88. 
26 Pempel, “Learning,” 122; Yuki Tatsumi, Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can 
Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectations? (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008). 52. 
27 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 87 
28 Tatsumi, Japan’s, 53–54. 
29 Ibid., 53–56. 
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c. The Cabinet Office 
Replacing the Prime Minister’s Office in 2001, the Cabinet Office was 
given the authority to coordinate policy between the various ministries. These new 
powers made it easier for prime ministers to directly provide guidance to members of the 
Cabinet and the bureaucracy and to compel their compliance.30  Naturally, this required a 
larger staff, which grew from the 582 personnel in the former Prime Minister’s Office to 
over 2,200 in just two years.31  
C. THE PLAN-RATIONAL STATE: BUREAUCRATS RULE, POLITICIANS 
REIGN 
1. Overview 
The previous sections outlining how the Japanese government is organized have 
largely been restricted to descriptions of formal policy-making authority.  In other words, 
these sections mostly described the official powers of each portion of the government’s 
policy formation structure.  This does not, however, account for more informal means of 
power like control of information, deference to certain groups, or other more intangible 
means of control.  These aspects, as in any government, play a large role in how policy is 
actually made and implemented.  The analysis of these informal centers of power has 
resulted in widely divergent theories of policy formation.  One of the most influential 
paradigms is the plan-rational or developmental state model. 
The concept of the plan-rational state is most closely associated with Chalmers 
Johnson and his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925-1975. The underlying theme is succinctly stated by Johnson as, “[t]he politicians 
reign and the bureaucrats rule.”32  Johnson argues there are three “central institutions” in 
Japanese policy-making, “the bureaucracy, the LDP, and the larger Japanese business 
concerns.”  Each of these has a distinct role.  LDP approval “legitimate[s] the work of the 
                                                 
30 Mulgan, "Japan’s,” 88. 
31 Pempel, “Learning,” 122. 
32 Johnson, MITI, 154. 
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bureaucracy.”  The bureaucracy creates and implements policies that are beneficial to the 
nation, which indirectly the helps the LDP win elections.  The business community funds 
the LDP in return in an attempt to gain influence on policy.33  Since this thesis is focused 
on the relationship between defense bureaucrats and politicians, it will not contain more 
than incidental information on the business community.  
2. Bureaucratic Control of Politicians 
At its core, Johnson describes a system with a tremendous power imbalance of 
bureaucrats over politicians, largely based on the structure and processes adopted by the 
Japanese government.   
Central to this is how little control the politically appointed head of each ministry 
has over his or her subordinates.  This is partly a function of being numerically 
overwhelmed since there are so few political appointees in each ministry.  Furthermore, 
of these, only the minister is a seasoned, experienced politician and the parliamentary 
vice ministers are effectively powerless.34  Additionally, the political appointees typically 
hold their positions for only one to one and a half years, whereas their senior civil service 
subordinates have been bureaucrats for 25 to 30 years.  Consequently, bureaucrats are 
simply more knowledgeable and can overcome their political supervisors on most matters 
that require expertise.35  Exacerbating this, the bureaucrats typically feel a greater loyalty 
to one another than to the political leadership and openly scorn peers who are perceived 
to have violated this.  With this strong group identity, bureaucrats will resort to 
underhanded measures to block political influence.36 
Bureaucratic control, Johnson argues, extends beyond the ministry and up through 
the Diet and Cabinet.  Accordingly, legislation is not truly negotiated amongst politicians 
but rather inside and between the various elements of the bureaucracy.37  To control the 
                                                 
33 Johnson, MITI, 50. 
34 Campbell, “Democracy,” 117. 
35 Pempel and Muramatsu, “Japanese,” 38. 
36 Johnson, MITI, 54–55 
37 Ibid., 47. 
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executive, the administrative vice-ministers met the day before the Cabinet with the 
purpose of agreeing on the agenda and decisions that would be reached the next day.  As 
a result, Cabinet meetings typically lasted less than 15 minutes and resulted in numerous 
approvals but little discussion.38  
Similarly, Johnson asserts that bureaucrats are the driving force behind the 
majority of legislation passed in the Diet and that legislators do little more than rubber 
stamp proposed bills.  He supports this claim with the quantity of bills drafted by the 
bureaucracy and their high passage rate compared against those written by Diet members.  
For example, during one session of the Diet in the 1950s, the bureaucracy drafted 175 
bills with 145 of them becoming law (82.9 percent).  Diet members, however, wrote just 
68 bills and only 15 of them passed (22.1 percent).39  Further supporting this, Johnson 
rejects the widespread perception that the PARC plays any meaningful role in supervising 
the bureaucracy or generating policy, stating the, “evidence to support such a view is 
quite thin.”  Instead, Johnson argues that while the PARC does conduct some limited 
oversight of the bureaucracy, too many of the Diet members who serve in it are retired 
bureaucrats for it to be a truly independent body.40 
Despite the preponderance of the bureaucracy, the LDP and Diet have two 
important roles.  First, since the Diet is the supreme political authority in a democratic 
Japan its approval is necessary to demonstrate that the bureaucracy’s actions are 
sanctioned and legitimate. Secondly, they provide sufficient political room for 
bureaucrats to perform their duties.  In effect, the politicians are expected to shield 
bureaucrats from special interests so that the latter can make policies that benefit all of 
Japan instead of just a small sector. Related to this, Johnson argues that both “the 
legislative and judicial branches of government must be restricted to ‘safety valve’ 
functions” to curtail those rare occasions of bureaucratic overreach.41 
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The ideal minister, from a bureaucrat’s perspective, is one who is powerful 
politically and detached administratively.  Bureaucrats want a minster who is strong 
enough within the party and Diet to serve as a forceful advocate but is uninterested in 
influencing the internal workings of his or her ministry.  Unfortunately for the 
bureaucrats, this combination is rare, as those people who can gain political power often 
have their own ideas.  Johnson asserts that aside from the education and agricultural 
bureaucracies, ministers who attempted to exert control over their ministries have seldom 
made any lasting impact.42 
D. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL: POLITICIANS DELEGATE, 
BUREAUCRATS SERVE 
1. Overview: Same Data, Different Conclusions 
Chalmers Johnson and the concept of the plan-rational state are not without 
critics.  In 1993, J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth published Japan’s 
Political Marketplace, which articulated a counterargument to Johnson. Their underlying 
premise is that the relationship between Japanese politicians and bureaucrats follows a 
principal-agent model in which the politicians are the principals and the bureaucrats are 
their agents.  In this model, bureaucrats know that politicians can easily override and 
punish them so instead of challenging that authority, they opt to proactively implement 
the goals of the political leadership.  Importantly, this theory is “observationally 
equivalent” to Johnson’s plan-rational model since it prompts behavior that looks 
identical.43 Pempel and Muramatsu succinctly describe this phenomenon stating, “In 
short, what appeared to be a high level of bureaucratic autonomy from politics reflected 
instead an LDP so powerful vis-à-vis the broad outlines of the civil service, its policies, 
and its personnel as to make day-to-day intervention unnecessary.”44 
                                                 
42 The LDP had strong incentives to interfere in agricultural policy due to its dependency on rural 
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2. Political Control of Bureaucrats 
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth assert that politicians control bureaucrats through the 
use of “implicit contracts.”  These fall into four categories.45 
The first implicit contract is the power of the veto.  Bureaucrats know that they 
will lose any overt confrontation with the political leadership.  Consequently, they do not 
propose legislation or implement regulations that they believe will incite political 
intervention.  This does not mean that bureaucrats will enact the exact policies preferred 
by the politicians but it will constrain their actions to some permissible amount of slack.46 
Second, the politicians decide who gets promoted to the highest positions in the 
bureaucracy.  Consequently, ambitious bureaucrats have incentives to formulate policies 
that are popular with the political leadership and ensure their subordinates implement 
them.  Furthermore, this causes self-selection into the bureaucratic ranks.  Given the 
LDP’s long hold on power, people who disagreed with the government’s policies did not 
even try to become bureaucrats, resulting in a civil service that was inherently aligned 
with the dominant party.47 
Third, politicians employ a variety of methods to acquire information on how 
faithfully the bureaucracy is implementing their desires.  For example, politicians 
encourage their constituents to complain about policies they dislike.  Additionally, the 
LDP (and possibly now the DPJ) identify ambitious bureaucrats who want a second 
career in politics.  In return for reporting agency slack, they receive political support in 
their post-civil service election campaigns.  Also, the LDP pits various bureaucracies 
against each other, which incites them to report slack in other agencies.48 
Fourth, politicians take advantage of amakudari by treating it like a bond.  Since 
bureaucrats are typically in their forties or fifties when they reach mandatory retirement 
age and since they are not paid particularly competitive wages while in government 
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47 Ibid., 107. 
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service, they need well paying second careers.  Furthermore, since the amount of money 
they can earn in the private sector is generally tied to how high they rose in the 
bureaucracy, their post-government salary is linked to the politically controlled 
promotion system.  Even more blatantly, politicians can help individual bureaucrats find 
their second careers.  Consequently, faithfully executing the politicians’ goals can 
dramatically improve a bureaucrat’s earning potential, whereas impeding them could 
carry a significant personal financial penalty.49 
3. Policy Delegation Rationale 
The implicit contracts concept demonstrates that politicians have a number of 
tools to control bureaucrats at a low cost to themselves, but it is insufficient to explain 
why the bureaucracy drafts the majority of legislation and appears to unilaterally 
implement countless regulations.  While Chalmers Johnson sees these activities as 
evidence of a powerful bureaucracy, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth see this as the 
manifestation of a dominant political party that has realized delegation to the bureaucracy 
gives it a distinct political advantage. 
Members of the Diet have shockingly small staffs, usually only having two state-
funded personnel each.  If the LDP increased this number, it would not gain any 
advantage since the opposition would also benefit.  However, when the LDP was firmly 
entrenched in power bureaucrats understood that their personal interests were best served 
by providing preferential treatment to the dominant party.  Consequently, the bureaucracy 
informally became the personal staff of the LDP and the opposition parties were left to 
fend for themselves. This also accounts for the high passage rate of bills drafted by the 
bureaucracy.  If bureaucrats are already working as the de facto staff of the dominant 
party, then any bills they write will have been implicitly or explicitly ordered by the LDP.  
Accordingly, it is natural that the Diet would approve the vast majority of them. 50 
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E. A CONFUSING MIDDLE-GROUND 
1. Who’s in Charge Here?  Everyone and No One 
Johnson’s plan-rational model and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth’s principal-agent 
model typify the two extremes in the debate on Japanese policy formation.  Many, if not 
most, other analysts fall somewhere in the middle, believing that there are various power 
sharing arrangements but no dominant groups.  Karel van Wolferen, while generally 
aligning closer to Chalmers Johnson and occasionally sounding mildly conspiratorial, 
captures the essence of this argument.  Referring to the Diet, the bureaucracy, and big 
business he states, “One will find many obvious bosses but no boss among bosses, nor 
one single controlling group of them.”51  Likewise, despite the bureaucracy’s apparent 
power, it is almost impossible to find a truly powerful bureaucrat.  This results from the 
frequent unwillingness of the administrative vice ministers to compromise with each 
other.  As a result they become deadlocked and effectively forfeit their own policy-
making authority. In effect, the strength and weakness displayed by various segments of 
the Japanese government and society is unpredictable and “[n]o elegant equation showing 
precisely how they relate to each other in their shares of power is possible.”52 
Other analysts have observed that the Japanese system has many unusual 
characteristics.  Aurelia George Mulgan has characterized it as a un-Westminster system.  
In a Westminster parliamentary system the cabinet is the most powerful segment of 
government since the backbenchers have little choice but to fall in line behind the prime 
minister.  Policy formation and implementation is top-down and the bureaucracy 
obediently follows the political leadership.  In Japan, however, the executive must 
compete with the bureaucracy and the party for influence over policy.  In fact, Mulgan 
implicitly assigns a slight advantage to the bureaucracy when she states that the party is 
the only organization with enough power to bargain with it.  The cabinet members are 
further undermined by the independence of their own political parties’ internal policy 
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formation mechanisms.  As a result, the role of the prime minister largely devolves to a 
job that “articulate[s] the agreed consensus reached in party bureaucratic negotiations.53 
Other authors attempt to define certain areas where one segment of government 
may have greater power over others.  For example, John Campbell argues that the 
bureaucracy is dominant in areas that are of little interest to politicians, traditionally, 
foreign aid and diplomacy, for example, but no matter how powerful the ministries may 
appear none of them can defeat a prolonged political pressure.54  Alisa Gaunder argues 
that the “political resources and personal attributes” of individual leaders are key factors 
in the successful implementation of political reforms.55  Tomohito Shinoda asserts that 
the 2001 government reorganization described above shifted power away from the ruling 
parties and to the Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretariat.56  Even Chalmers Johnson 
acknowledges that politicians dominate the education and agriculture bureaucracies 
because of domestic political issues and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth admit that a certain 
amount of slack will occur between the politicians and bureaucrats. 
The intent of this section is not to find fault with any particular school of thought 
but to illustrate that significantly different opinions, often using the same data, exist 
throughout the literature.  A general trend throughout more contemporary analyses, 
however, is to assert that power is distributed in a multi-polar fashion and that no single 
group dominates.  The three main participants in the government are the governing 
political party, the executive, and the bureaucracy.  Depending on the case being 
examined however, the relative power of each will vary. 
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F. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
1. Historical Development 
The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was founded in the aftermath of the Pacific 
War, largely in response to American pressure.  The Japanese government was 
understandably skeptical of reviving its defense establishment and created two structures 
to ensure its subordination to civilian authority.  First, the JDA was not a full-fledged 
ministry but merely an agency.  Consequently, it was directly administered by the Prime 
Minister’s office.  Second, the civilian-staffed Internal Bureau was created within the 
JDA to supervise the uniformed services.  The uniformed services, for their part, were 
expected to merely execute the policy decided upon by the civilian leadership.  From its 
inception to end of the Cold War, the JDA was informally placed on the policy sideline, 
considered more of a “management agency” rather than a “policy agency.”57 
Exacerbating its junior status was the fact that the other ministries saw the JDA as 
a useful location to place their excess bureaucrats.  Both MITI and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) were especially guilty of colonizing the JDA.  This became especially 
pronounced in the 1970s when MOF had a surplus of senior bureaucrats and the JDA had 
a shortage.58  Consequently, for much of the JDA’s existence, its senior civilian 
leadership was composed of bureaucrats from other ministries who had little interest in 
national security or loyalty to the defense bureaucracy. 
Japanese perceptions about the JDA began to change, however, after the Cold 
War, largely due to new security demands that highlighted the institution’s weaknesses. 
Chief among these were increasing international expectations for Japan to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, changing external security threats, and the growing importance 
of the security alliance with the United States.  Notably, Japan made only one  
                                                 
57 Tatsumi, Japan’s, 33–34, 49. 
58 The Police Agency, which would be transformed into the JDA, did not hire any new bureaucrats in 
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 18
amendment to the Self Defense Force Law between 1954 and 1989.  From 1990 to 2007, 
however, Japan has made more than 50 modifications.59 
Eventually, these concerns prompted the Japanese government to significantly 
reorganize its defense establishment.  In January 2007 the JDA was replaced with the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) (see figure 1).  This change elevated the defense bureaucracy 
to the highest levels of government.  Importantly, the MOD was now at the same 
administrative level as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and it could now directly 
negotiate its budget with MOF.  Despite these changes, however, many observers still 
believe that the MOD struggles with policy formation and planning.60   
2. MOD Policy Formation 
The Internal Bureau was retained in the transition from the JDA, and it still 
“manages the JSDF in its operation, planning, acquisition, and personnel.”  Additionally 
it is responsible for “relations with US forces in Japan, including addressing the 
grievances” against the American military.  Of the six sub-bureaus, the aptly named 
Defense Policy Bureau exerts the most influence on the ministry’s policy positions. This 
organization is responsible for “(1) shaping Japan’s defense policy, (2) managing the 
MOD’s defense exchanges, (3) planning the JSDF’s organization and platforms, and (4) 
playing a central role in the MOD’s efforts in collecting and analyzing intelligence.”61  
To accomplish these missions the Defense Policy Bureau is subdivided into multiple 
divisions.  The most important policy ones are briefly described here. 
The Defense Policy Division is the most senior division in the bureau and 
contains the Strategic Planning Office. This office is ostensibly tasked with “long-range 
strategy planning;” however its relatively low level in the Japanese bureaucracy and 
commensurately junior personnel limits its influence.62 
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Figure 1.   Ministry of Defense Organization Chart63 
                                                 
63  Japan Ministry of Defense, "Japan Ministry of Defense," The Ministry of Defense Reorganized, 
October 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/organization/reorganized/p4-5.pdf (accessed April 26, 2010). 
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The Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division was separated from the Defense 
Policy Division only eight months after the formation of the MOD to allow for more 
focused attention on issues relating to the US-Japan Alliance.64 
The International Division is tasked with managing “defense exchanges with 
countries other than the United States.”65  
The Defense Planning Division develops procurement and upgrade plans for the 
hardware operated by each uniformed service.66 
G. APPLYING THEORY TO DEFENSE POLICY FORMATION 
Unfortunately, very little of the extensive Japanese national security literature 
focuses on policy formation but rather on its international impact.  Frequently, this is 
done through the prism of realism, neo-institutionalism or some other theoretical 
paradigm that encourages analyzing states as singular actors.  To be sure, these authors 
acknowledge influences at each level of analysis, but this is often done in an ad hoc 
manner without developing a comprehensive theory for how those different domestic 
elements interrelate.  This is quite noticeable, for example, in Chalmers Johnson’s book 
Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State.  This book contains several 
essays covering the plan-rational model, but when Johnson turns to defense, he almost 
ignores the bureaucracy, choosing instead to focus on various prime ministers. 
These characteristics in the academic literature beg the question of whether or not 
existing policy formation theories are appropriate for the defense sector.  On the one 
hand, assuming these theories have broad applicability throughout the government seems 
reasonable.  On the other hand, even the proponents of certain theories admit that they are 
not suitable for all policy categories and Japan certainly has unique historical and 
constitutional factors affecting its outlook on defense.  The bottom line is that a 
systematic examination of the appropriateness of these theories is necessary before 
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drawing any conclusions.  The remainder of this thesis is an attempt to make tentative 
judgments on one narrow aspect of this larger question. 
As John Campbell observes, analyzing the policy formation process in Japan is 
difficult because “different policy areas have greatly different configurations of power; 
general statements about the relative strength of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the majority 
party, interest groups, or some other actor are hazardous unless they can be based on 
detailed evidence across the range of public policy.”67  With this warning in mind, this 
thesis will analyze the relationship between defense bureaucrats and politicians and 
assess the applicability of existing policy formation theories.  Admittedly, two case 
studies are insufficient to draw solid conclusions, but the cases chosen here contain 
characteristics that should be germane to other defense issues. 
The first case study is Japan’s participation in BMD.  This program provides an 
opportunity to examine a defense issue that has been in existence for over two decades, 
under multiple prime ministers, and before and after the 2001 government reorganization.  
Furthermore, it is a technically complex program that has been fairly uncontroversial and 
seemingly ignored by politicians and the public for extended periods.  These 
characteristics are similar to most of industrial policy, which is typically complex and 
largely out of the public eye.  Indeed, this case study will demonstrate several 
characteristics of Japanese defense policy formation.  Notably, the Diet, despite apparent 
passivity, implicitly constrained the objectives of defense bureaucrats and the executive.  
The division between bureaucrats and the executive is harder to distinguish, but in 
general, it appears that bureaucrats would push the program as far as they could within 
the politically imposed constraints of the Diet and lay the political groundwork for an 
expansion.  At this point, however, the bureaucracy became dependent on politicians, 
particularly those in the executive, to broaden those restraints.  Consequently, the BMD 
program nominally aligns with the principal-agent model, albeit with some qualifications.  
More importantly, however, is the inability of the plan-rational model to adequately  
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explain the interactions between the defense bureaucracy and the political leadership.  
This is even more significant since the BMD program is an ideal test case in applying this 
theory to defense policy. 
The second case study is the DPJ’s failed attempt to relocate MCAS Futenma.  
This fiasco provides the first opportunity to examine the DPJ and how it intends to 
govern.  This is particularly useful since the DPJ has promised to reform the 
government’s policy-making processes and concentrate power in the executive at the 
expense of the backbenchers and bureaucracy.  In fact, this case strongly indicates the 
political supremacy of the executive.  Despite opposition from the bureaucracy, the new 
DPJ Cabinet was able to make Futenma an issue and force the Japanese government to 
attempt negotiations.  Importantly, the DPJ’s failure was due the refusal of the United 
States to negotiate and some poor political and management decisions within the Cabinet, 
and bureaucratic resistance was, at most, incidental.  While definitive conclusions cannot 
be drawn yet, this case study provides further evidence that defense policy formation 
tends towards the principal-agent model. 
A brief note about American political pressure is necessary before proceeding to 
the case studies.  Japan’s only military ally is the United States and Japan is clearly the 
junior partner in that relationship.  Consequently, the United States plays a prominent 
role in each of the case studies.  Certainly, American pressure influences Japanese policy-
making, but this is likely true in other policy areas as well.  Furthermore, this thesis 
focuses on the relationship between bureaucrats, politicians in the Diet, and politicians in 
the executive. In other words, even if American policies are a deciding factor in the 
ultimate outcome of a defense issue, that fact is immaterial to an analysis of the 
relationships between various groups within the Japanese government.  Consequently, 
this thesis treats American pressure as simply another factor affecting how each of those 
groups makes its own decisions. 
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II. CASE STUDY: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Japan has cooperated with the United States on BMD for more than two decades.  
At first, this was limited to industry-to-industry contact but slowly and steadily the 
program expanded.  Today, Japan has deployed its own BMD system and even gone so 
far as reinterpreting its long-standing ban on collective self-defense to allow better 
operational coordination with the United States.  Remarkably, despite the tremendous 
financial cost and political changes that BMD required, interactions between the defense 
bureaucrats and politicians were remarkably without rancor. 
Since the BMD program’s inception, the executive, the Diet, and the bureaucracy 
have consistently followed the same basic pattern.  The Diet would establish an implicit, 
if vague, upper limit and then the executive would secure authorization for a somewhat 
lower but tangible boundary.  At this point, the management of the BMD program would 
shift to the bureaucracy where it was largely ignored by the political leadership until it 
reached the boundary established by the executive.  The pattern would repeat once the 
Diet’s implicit limit increased. 
Importantly, this pattern of policy formation does not neatly align with either the 
plan-rational or principal-agent models.  Aspects of both theories appear throughout the 
program and, at times, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish which of the 
three parts of the policy formation triangle are pushing BMD ahead and which are being 
pulled along.  This case study, however, provides a particularly useful test of the plan-
rational model due to the similarities between the BMD program and the industrial 
policies that influenced Chalmers Johnson’s work.  Like many industrial policies, BMD 
is a highly technical program that has never sparked deep or impassioned public debate.  
According to Johnson, this is the natural purview of the bureaucrat.  That the principal-
agent model seems to be a better fit for BMD, albeit with significant caveats, indicates 
that the plan-rational framework may not be broadly applicable to defense policy. 
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This case study is divided into four main sections.  The first two sections provide 
background information to help place the subsequent discussion in context.  These 
sections briefly describe the technical aspects of the BMD system Japan is deploying and 
an overview of the major concerns expressed by elements within the Japanese 
government throughout the program’s existence.  The next section discusses the BMD 
program chronologically and describes how the Diet, executive, and bureaucracy 
interacted while formulating policy.  The final section is a conclusion that highlights the 
overarching themes throughout the BMD program. 
B. JAPAN’S BMD SYSTEMS – A TIERED DEFENSE 
In 2003, Japan announced plans to deploy a multi-layered missile defense system 
(see figure 2).68 The first layer, or tier, called Aegis BMD, is a modification of the 
American Aegis air defense system.69  Currently the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force 
(JMSDF) operates four Aegis equipped Kongo class guided missile destroyers and is 
upgrading each of them to fulfill the BMD mission.70  If positioned correctly in relation 
to the attacking missile, two to three Aegis BMD-equipped ships can defend all of Japan, 
making it a theater wide defensive system.71 The missile used by Aegis BMD, the SM-3, 
does not contain a traditional explosive warhead but instead destroys its target by 
colliding with it in a so-called hit-to-kill intercept. Aegis BMD intercepts are 
exoatmospheric, classifying it as an upper tier system.72 
The second layer is the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), a modification of 
the American Patriot surface-to-air missile system.  Like the SM-3 it also uses hit-to-kill 
intercepts to destroy its target; however, it does this in the attacking missile’s terminal 
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phase.73   Consequently, the PAC-3 is classified as a lower tier system and defends a 
much smaller geographic area like high value military concentrations or population 
centers.  The PAC-3 system is intended to intercept missiles that penetrate the Aegis 
BMD shield.74 
 
Figure 2.   Japan’s BMD Architecture75 
 
Both of these systems require significant amounts of time-sensitive data because 
the detect-to-engage timeline is measured in minutes. Consequently, Japanese and 
American missile defenses rely on data supplied by the other nation to ensure the earliest 
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possible launch detection.  This mutual dependency is not balanced, however, since Japan 
lacks an equivalent to America’s space based missile detection system. 76 
Finally, since ballistic missile defense programs have been reorganized and 
renamed several times since their inception in the 1980s a brief note on terminology is 
necessary. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is the name adopted by the United States in 
the 1990s for programs designed to counter short to medium range missiles but not 
intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBM).  TMD covers both the Aegis BMD and 
PAC-3 programs.  National Missile Defense (NMD) should not be confused with TMD.  
The NMD program does not include Japan and is intended to intercept ICBMs targeting 
the United States itself.  Importantly, while BMD is generally used in the United States as 
a generic term for all ballistic missile defense programs, in Japan it is synonymous with 
TMD.77  Consequently, the term BMD will be used throughout this thesis according to 
the Japanese definition. Finally, in the interests of clarity, unless explicitly stated, the 
terms BMD, Aegis BMD, and PAC-3 will be used regardless of what terminology was in 
use at that specific time. 
C. JAPANESE CONCERNS WITH BMD 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between defense 
bureaucrats and politicians and not the technological feasibility of a certain system, the 
international relations impact of specific decisions, or the constitutionality of defense 
programs.  The BMD policies formed by the defense bureaucrats and politicians, 
however, are rooted in these issues.  Consequently, a brief description of the major 
debates surrounding BMD is essential for contextualizing the various positions taken by 
different actors within the Japanese government.  Similarly, briefly describing each issue 
at the outset will preclude the need for an awkward aside later and allow for a more 
coherent analysis of the power relationships between the defense bureaucracy and the 
political leadership.  Likewise, since all these issues have been exhaustively documented 
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elsewhere and are not the focus of this thesis, the merits of each argument will not be 
analyzed.  The fact that they were significant issues within the policy formation processes 
internal to the Japanese government is sufficient justification for their inclusion here. 
1.  Technical Feasibility 
Just as in the United States, many Japanese critics of BMD argue that the system 
is simply technologically too difficult.  Hit-to-kill intercept technology is often derisively 
described as trying to hit a bullet with a bullet, and the detect-to-engage timeline is so 
short that successfully shooting down a missile is extremely difficult.  These critics often 
assert that many, if not all, the successful American BMD tests have been blatantly 
scripted.78 
A closely related criticism is that developing and deploying a BMD system is 
simply too expensive.  These critics are frequently divided into two groups.  Some argue 
that not only is BMD expensive but it will never work well enough making it a total 
waste of money.  Others argue that BMD may be technologically feasible but at far too 
high a cost and that the same money would contribute more to national security if spent 
elsewhere.79 
The arguments against BMD based on the technological risks combined with the 
high cost were particularly salient within MOF.80 
2.  Constitutionality, Collective Self-Defense, and the Weaponization of 
Space 
The technological requirements of BMD raise constitutional issues. The 
extremely short detect-to-engage timeline dictates sharing detection and targeting 
information between the United States and Japan in real-time.  This means that 
information provided by the Japanese could be used by the United States to intercept 
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ballistic missiles that are not targeting Japan or as part of unilateral American military 
operations.  This directly challenges Japan’s prohibition on collective self-defense.81 
A related legal obstacle was the 1969 Diet resolution that prohibited the 
weaponization of space.  Since BMD intercepts occur on the edge of the atmosphere 
many argued that this would be a violation.  These concerns, combined with other 
military uses for space including intelligence and communications satellites, were 
resolved through subsequent reinterpretations of the 1969 resolution and finally the 2008 
Basic Law on Space.82 
3.  Alliance Entrapment 
Many Japanese critics have voiced concern that Japan will be drawn into an 
American conflict because of BMD.  This is mostly a function of Japan’s dependence on 
the United States’ missile warning systems, especially its missile detection satellites. 
Without access to this information, the already short BMD engagement timeline becomes 
almost unmanageable, providing the United States considerable leverage to coerce 
Japanese actions in a crisis.83  Another aspect of entrapment is the fear that the US-Japan 
Alliance would be permanently weakened if Japanese concerns over violating the ban on 
collective self-defense prevented the JSDF from intercepting ballistic missiles that were 
attacking the United States or at least providing tracking data.84  These concerns combine 
into a fear that Japan could be forced to take part in an American led war that it does not 
want to pursue. 
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4.  Antagonizing Neighbors 
Some Japanese critics cite unnecessarily antagonizing neighbors as a primary 
concern.  While supporters typically claim that BMD is purely defensive, critics argue 
that it will provide a shield that will embolden Japan to become more assertive 
internationally.  Similarly, the creation of a defensive shield over Japan could prompt 
other Asian states, notably China, to become more aggressive and begin to expand their 
own militaries.85  Not being party to a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
between the United States and Russia was a concern as well, however, the American 
withdrawal has caused this argument to fade.86 
The fear of unnecessarily antagonizing China was of particular concern to MOFA 
but, importantly, the diplomats responsible for managing the alliance with the United 
States did not share it.  The balance of power began to shift towards the pro-BMD 
diplomats following China’s subdued reaction to Japan’s 1999 decision to increase 
research and development efforts.87  
5.  Japanese Industry 
Many critics, especially in the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), 
cite a fear that Japan will transfer significant technology to the United States but will not 
receive reciprocal treatment.88  This concern stems from Japan’s painful experience in the 
1980s and 1990s with the FS-X fighter program.  Bowing to extensive American 
pressure, Japan agreed to jointly develop an improved F-16 fighter instead of developing 
an indigenous design.  Shortly after forcing this program on Japan, however, the United 
States changed its policy based on domestic politics and became a reluctant partner.  The  
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end result, the F-2, was overpriced and severely delayed.89  Despite the understandable 
caution, however, some portions of industry see possible business opportunities in 
BMD.90 
D. EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE BMD PROGRAM 
1.  1986 to 1993: Political-Bureaucratic Consensus - Defer Decisions 
Japanese involvement with missile defense dates back to the Reagan 
administration, although for years it was marked by hesitation on both the political and 
bureaucratic fronts.  Due to shared concerns over the impact BMD would have on 
Japan’s international relations, inter-service concerns over budgetary tradeoffs, and 
significant legal and constitutional questions, neither the defense bureaucracy nor the 
political leadership were enthusiastic supporters. 
Despite this general consensus to ignore American invitations to participate in 
BMD research and development, certain sectors of the Japanese government did not want 
to appear completely uninterested.  The most tangible support came, in fact, from Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.  For Nakasone, however, participating in President 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as it was known then, had virtually nothing 
to do with national security policy.  Instead, he saw it as an opportunity to help assuage 
American frustration during the trade disputes of the 1980s and to win the appearance 
domestically of being a hardliner against the Soviet Union.91 
This did not translate into significant material support.  In fact, the Japanese 
government effectively kicked SDI to private industry because of concerns over violating 
the 1969 resolution on the peaceful use of space and the appearance of assisting with a 
weapon system related to nuclear strategy.92  The resulting four-year analysis called the 
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Western Pacific Basin Architecture Study was completed in 1993 and examined BMD 
system requirements throughout the region.  Shortly after this study the Japanese 
government began to reassert its position in BMD policy through the formation of the 
Japanese-American TMD Working Group, staffed on the Japanese side with JDA 
personnel.93  The increased government involvement was partly due to North Korea’s 
No-dong missile test in 1994 that gave it a demonstrated capability to target Japan.94  
The defense bureaucrats had their own reasons for forestalling participation in 
BMD research.  On purely technical grounds, the JDA was concerned about the 
effectiveness of BMD.  This was exacerbated by the likely exorbitant cost that would 
detract from higher priority acquisitions.  Furthermore, JDA officials feared that pursuing 
a BMD system could be interpreted as a lack of faith in America’s willingness to live up 
to its alliance obligations.95  Consequently, the bureaucrats and politicians, for their own 
reasons, agreed to defer any substantive decisions on BMD. 
Admittedly, the early years of Japan’s participation in BMD research tell us little 
about the relative power of bureaucrats and politicians.  The consensus to defer decisions, 
however, illustrates that there was a lack of complete agreement in either group and that 
few people felt strongly enough to force the issue.  These fissures, while small at first, 
would allow the room for bureaucrats and politicians to maneuver against each other as 
various opinions became more firmly held.  In fact, by the time the Japanese-American 
TMD Working Group had been formed in 1993 a core of JDA officials had decided 
pursuing BMD was in their interests.  Furthermore, responding to North Korean 
provocations by increasing support for BMD established a pattern that would repeat 
throughout the program.  The next section will describe how the JDA came to an internal 
consensus in support of BMD along with a few key politicians and how they used North 
Korean actions to further their agenda. 
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2.  1993 to August 1998: JDA Forms a Consensus 
During the mid-1990s Japan began conducting limited joint research and 
development on BMD but deferred decisions on significant deployment, legal, and 
constitutional questions.  Concurrently, defense bureaucrats came to a consensus to 
pursue BMD but other bureaucracies, especially MOFA, MOF, and METI, remained 
skeptical.  Politicians, for their part, established the political space in which the JDA 
could pursue BMD research but exerted power, both through action and inaction, to 
control the pace.  The North Korean missile test over Japan in 1998, however, proved to 
be a catalyzing event that prompted disparate groups to coalesce in support of BMD. 
a. Inside the Japan Defense Agency 
Within the JDA, civilian bureaucrats had to entertain the conflicting views 
of the uniformed services.  Predictably, the divisions split along interservice lines due to 
budgetary issues. 
The most supportive service was the JMSDF.  Since a significant portion 
of the BMD shield would likely be built around the Aegis system, the maritime services 
stood to gain significant funding.  This might not only mean upgrades to the existing four 
Kongo class destroyers but possibly acquiring new Aegis warships and improved 
training.96 
Likewise, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) showed reasonably 
strong support.  Unlike the United States where the Army operates the various versions of 
the Patriot missile, the Japanese have assigned that mission to the JASDF meaning it 
could expect to be responsible for PAC-3.  Furthermore, the JASDF could use the 
addition of a BMD mission as justification for the costly command and control upgrades 
associated with the replacement of its aging air defense system.  The largest reason the 
JASDF did not provide stronger support was concern that the expense of BMD would 
decrease its acquisition of new aircraft.97 
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The most hesitant service was the Japan Ground Self Defense Force 
(JGSDF).  This was the largest and most influential service but it had little to gain and 
quite a bit to lose if Japan chose to pursue BMD.  The JGSDF, however, is unofficially 
seen as the senior service and its high-ranking officers, more so than the other services, 
are expected to make decisions based on national instead of parochial interests.  
Consequently, the ground services could potentially be persuaded to support BMD if a 
compelling strategic case could be made.98 
In addition to the uniformed services, the defense bureaucrats were also 
split.  Personnel whose careers were focused on operations were concerned that the 
expense of BMD would force cuts in more useful programs weakening Japan overall.  
Personnel who were responsible for research and development supported BMD but 
possessed limited influence.  Finally, those personnel focused on managing the alliance 
with the United States saw BMD cooperation as a means to prove Japan’s worth to its 
only military ally.99 
These concerns aside, the civilian leadership within the JDA began to 
move towards a consensus that pursuing BMD was in the interests of Japan.  These 
bureaucrats understood, however, that the high cost of BMD prevented MOF support, 
fear over China’s reaction concerned MOFA, and memories of ineffective and costly 
industrial cooperation made METI cautious. Similarly, as described below Japanese 
politicians were split on BMD.  Consequently, once the JDA had decided in the spring of 
1998 to move ahead with BMD it still needed to proceed carefully in order to build an 
adequate consensus within the whole government.  Importantly, the JDA’s decision to 
pursue BMD was made prior to North Korea’s missile launch over Japan, although that is 
not how it would be presented later to the Japanese public.100 
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b.  Political Leadership or the Lack Thereof 
Many Japanese politicians prefer to ignore defense issues in order to avoid 
undesired domestic or international controversy, but they still must manage the alliance 
with the United States. This results at times in politicians taking an active stance and 
creating policy and at others turning a blind eye.101  Another option, that is frequently 
employed is to find a middle ground where they provide just enough support to relieve 
American pressure and assuage the more hawkish domestic elements while postponing 
contentious debate indefinitely. 
The pattern of limited support combined with deferring controversial 
decisions is evident under the Hashimoto and Obuchi cabinets.  This course is a rational 
outgrowth of the conflicting pressures both of those cabinets faced.  On the one hand 
defense bureaucrats and the United States were pressing the Japanese government to 
proceed with joint BMD research and development.  On the other hand MOF and METI 
bureaucrats advocated various levels of caution due to domestic concerns while some of 
their counterparts at MOFA worried about adversely impacting relations with China. 
Given these conflicting demands it is not especially surprising that Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto took a personal interest in BMD nor is it particularly 
remarkable that his successor Keizo Obuchi preferred to delegate.  Both are rational 
political choices with one prime minister perhaps more interested in personally averting 
potential political damage and another choosing to insert some public distance.  In both 
cases, however, the prime ministers chose similar policies supporting limited joint BMD 
research.  Prime Minister Hashimoto’s personal support was likely a key reason that the 
Diet voted to support a budget request from the JDA to conduct joint research with the 
United States.  Prime Minister Obuchi, through his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu 
Nonaka, maintained this support and ensured continued funding.102  Importantly, despite  
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supporting joint research these policies did not commit Japan to deploying a system or 
make any attempt to solve the significant constitutional or legal hurdles associated with 
BMD. 
Additionally, despite their actions, neither Hashimoto nor Obuchi ever 
appeared to base their support on anything more than satisfying short-term political 
interests.  Their support placated those who wanted to pursue BMD and the United States 
but was never a firm enough commitment to evoke strong opposition from MOFA, MOF, 
METI, the public, or outspoken members of the Diet.  Furthermore, occasional efforts by 
members of the Diet to draw attention to certain controversial aspects of the program 
failed to gain any political traction.   In fact, both prime ministers, Obuchi in particular, 
were content to allow backbenchers within the LDP raise these issues provided no effort 
was made to actually resolve them.  For example, LDP Diet Member and former JDA 
Director General, Fukushiro Nukaga, issued a report that Japan would need to modify its 
laws preventing the weaponization of space if it committed to BMD.103  While Nukaga 
was correct, these concerns were not resolved until the passage of the Basic Law on 
Space nine years later.104  All told, both the Diet and the executive demonstrated a 
pronounced unwillingness to tackle potentially contentious issues surrounding BMD.  
3.  September 1998 to August 1999: Thank You Dear Leader 
In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan and the political 
atmosphere changed overnight.  Missile defense research and development, an issue that 
had largely been handled within the confines of government, suddenly entered the public 
discourse. This increased the influence of the JDA, which had already decided to pursue 
BMD before the North Korean missile test, especially since the relative strength of MOF, 
MOFA, and METI’s critiques was now diminished.  The political leadership largely split 
along ideological lines but the LDP and the major opposition parties were generally  
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supportive of some sort of missile defense, although the details of what each politician 
supported varied.  Importantly, while media coverage was fairly extensive in quantity the 
debate itself was, at best, shallow in quality. 
a.  The Diet 
The Diet, like the rest of Japan, was caught off guard by the North Korean 
missile launch.  Consequently, while all members felt a response was required, as 
evidenced by the Diet’s unanimously approved resolution denouncing North Korea, there 
was little consensus on what other steps the government should take.  Furthermore, 
ballistic missile defense is a technologically complex program that few members fully 
understood, making meaningful debate difficult.105 
Not surprisingly, the debate often was superficial and individual members’ 
support largely followed party lines.  The more conservative and ruling LDP was the 
strongest supporter of BMD.  Many LDP politicians brushed aside the more complicated 
legal and international issues with the argument expressed by Diet member Katsuhito 
Asano that, “Protecting yourself against incoming missiles is the epitome of a purely 
defensive system.”  The DPJ was internally divided between former socialists and former 
LPD members, and could not take any substantive position.  The Communist Party and 
Social Democrats voiced some opposition and agreed with the elements in MOFA that 
believed BMD could unnecessarily antagonize Japan’s neighbors.  Komeito, for its part, 
was cautious about proceeding with BMD asked for more information, which raised the 
visibility of several significant obstacles.106 
Importantly, while the Diet could not arrive at a consensus on BMD and 
no party fully endorsed the program, the fact that some parties had expressed reserved 
support changed the implicit political boundaries.  Consequently, the executive and 
bureaucracy still had to be concerned about inciting a political backlash if they pushed 
BMD too far, but that tacit limit was now higher.  This meant that the Diet did not block 
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the prime minister’s decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
United States, committing Japan to participate in further research and development. 
b.  The Prime Minister 
The North Korean missile test occurred just two months into Prime 
Minister Keizo Obuchi’s term.  While he was a supporter of BMD he was typically 
preferred to have his Chief Cabinet Secretary take the lead on garnering support within 
the Diet.107  Given that the defense bureaucracy had already laid the administrative 
groundwork, the LDP generally supported it, and the opposition parties that opposed it 
were small, this low level of prime ministerial involvement was still sufficient to gain 
increased funding for further BMD cooperation with the United States.  This lack of 
leadership and unwillingness to instigate a political fight, however, can be seen in the 
MOU signed in 1999. 
c.  Memorandum of Understanding – August 1999 
In August of 1999, the Obuchi administration signed an MOU with the 
United States.  Under this agreement, Japan agreed to share technology and 
developmental costs relating to the Aegis BMD system through the newly formed Japan-
U.S. Joint Technological Research Project.  Over the five-year period covered by the 
MOU Japan would be responsible for upgrades to the seeker, warhead, propulsion and 
nose cone of the existing interceptor missile. 108 
Importantly, this agreement only covered research and development costs 
and did not commit Japan to deployment.  This conveniently allowed the Prime Minister 
and the JDA to defer criticism from the public and the Diet by acknowledging that while 
there were constitutional, legal, budgetary, technical, and international issues, it was 
premature to worry about any of them since no decision had yet been made about actually 
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acquiring a system.109  Consequently, this followed the pattern established over the 
previous decade to slowly expand the BMD program but to defer the substantive 
decisions as long as possible. 
4.  September 1999 to December 2003: Thank You Again, Dear Leader! 
After Japan signed the MOU with the United States, BMD largely retreated from 
public sight again until 2002.  Despite the lack of a public discussion, however, work had 
not stopped.  In fact, the lack of public attention and the highly technical nature of 
ballistic missile defense combined to allow the bureaucrats to reassume a larger 
leadership role.  By 2003, however, two significant developments had occurred that 
reignited the BMD debate.  Most shocking to the Japanese was the series of events in 
North Korea that resulted in that state withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, detonating a nuclear device, and conducting further ballistic missile tests.  
Second, due to domestic political demands the political leadership quietly backed away 
from its tacit belief that BMD must provide a virtually perfect screen in order to be 
considered technologically feasible.  Combined, these factors played a key role in the 
Japanese government’s decision to deploy a BMD capability. 
a.  The JDA 
As the JDA became increasingly involved in managing the technical 
aspects of BMD, its internal consensus to pursue the program strengthened.  While the 
JDA had already decided to pursue BMD research and development several years earlier 
the interservice and internal bureaucratic divides had still not been fully resolved.  A 
number of factors combined, however, to bring the dissenters around to the majority 
opinion.  First, in the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear and missile tests, the 
Japanese public expressed a strong desire for some sort of defense.  This desire resonated 
strongly with the JDA and further solidified its desire to deploy a BMD system.  Perhaps 
more important was a reorganization within the uniformed services that included 
reprioritizing missions.  Combined with this was a decision to purchase a more or less 
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off-the-shelf BMD system, which would be significantly less expensive than creating a 
new one.  These various factors shifted the JDA’s position on funding.  Through 2002 the 
JDA had argued that BMD should be funded as a special item outside of the unofficial 
one percent of GDP cap on defense spending.  By mid-200, the JDA had changed course 
and agreed that BMD was of such a high priority that it would cut back on modernization 
of its other forces in to fund deployment.110 
b.  The Prime Minister 
The trend of decreasing prime ministerial involvement would continue 
even in the face of North Korean provocations and increased public concern.  In fact, the 
only two prime ministers who had taken a personal interest in BMD thus far were 
Nakasone, who essentially punted it to industry, and Hashimoto, who was influential in 
getting funding and initiating governmental cooperation with the United States.  Prime 
Minister Obuchi, however, began the trend of Prime Ministerial non-involvement.  While 
it is true that Japan had signed the 1999 MOU with the United States under his watch it 
was clear that BMD had largely been delegated to his Chief Cabinet Secretary.  The nadir 
of Prime Ministerial involvement was Yoshiro Mori, who was “lacking both the political 
base and necessary stature with regard to foreign and defense policy” to exert any real 
leadership.111  In fact, what may be most notable about Mori’s tenure was the lack of 
virtually any leadership resulting in the JDA becoming the sole manager of BMD.112 
The relative balance between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the 
JDA would largely follow this pattern.  Most notably, when Koizumi publicly told 
President George W. Bush that Japan would deploy a ballistic missile defense system he 
was not announcing new policy but rather publicly stating the decision the JDA had made 
months before.113  The reasons for Koizumi’s lack of involvement in BMD are not 
known for certain but are worthy of a brief discussion. 
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Koizumi had a number of plausible reasons for making BMD a low 
priority.  To be sure, he could have treated it like postal service reform, energizing a 
rather indifferent public, and making it a signature issue, but that would have consumed 
significant political effort.  Given that Koizumi was largely perceived to not have strong 
personal preferences about BMD, especially compared to other policy areas, it is not 
surprising that he focused his efforts elsewhere.  Furthermore, BMD was not a 
preeminent issue in the US-Japan alliance during Koizumi’s tenure.  The United States 
was far more concerned with gaining direct Japanese assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Koizumi’s efforts to support both of these conflicts were already redefining Japan’s 
national security policies and were extremely controversial.114  BMD could easily 
increase Koizumi’s domestic political costs should his opponents decide to highlight any 
of the unresolved questions about the program like its constitutionality, cost, or regional 
impact.  At the same time, implementing a BMD program would not have made a 
significant difference in the relationship with the United States.  Consequently, BMD was 
a program that had significant potential costs and few potential gains.  Given these 
incentives, it is reasonable that Koizumi chose to follow whatever path was politically 
expedient.  
While Koizumi may have lacked personal interest in BMD, however, the 
same cannot be said about his defense chief.  In fact, JDA Director General Shigeru 
Ishiba is the only person in the Cabinet who exerted any leadership on BMD.115.  Ishiba 
had long been an advocate of strengthening Japan’s defenses and felt that most of the 
constitutional and legal concerns regarding BMD could be solved.116   He also played an 
important role in testing the political sensitivity of BMD.  While making ostensibly 
personal comments Ishiba strongly argued that Japan should deploy a BMD system.  
Officially rebuked for these statements, Ishiba had, in fact, made them with the full  
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concurrence of the cabinet and Prime Minister Koizumi.  When the comments did not 
invite condemnation from the public or the Diet, Koizumi knew that he could safely 
pursue deployment of a BMD system.117 
Finally, changing perceptions on the technical feasibility of the system and 
the required effectiveness converged to make BMD more acceptable.  Prior to 2003 
Japanese politicians had held an unrealistic expectation that a BMD system must be 
capable of stopping every single missile.  Since no system is 100 percent effective this 
demand could never be met.  With the emergence of a potentially operational nuclear 
force in North Korea, however, any ability to intercept incoming ballistic missiles began 
to appear preferential to no ability.  This changing perception was bolstered by recent 
successful BMD tests.  Prior to late 2002, the BMD testing program had been plagued 
with several high profile failures and strong criticism that those tests that had succeeded 
only did so because they were highly scripted and unrealistic.  By late 2002, however, 
Aegis BMD had conducted two successful tests, albeit with lingering concerns over their 
realism, with only one additional failure.  Given the anxiety induced by the North Korean 
nuclear tests even this rather low success rate was politically acceptable.118  The 
convergence of these two changing perceptions influenced the Cabinet’s decision to 
deploy BMD. 
In 2003, then Chief Cabinet Secretary and soon-to-be Prime Minister 
Yasuo Fukuda announced the government’s decision to deploy both the upper tier Aegis 
BMD and lower tier PAC-3 systems.119  His announcement addressed some of the 
criticisms of the program but ignored others.  It did attempt to ameliorate technical 
concerns by noting “that rapid progress of the relevant technologies of BMD has recently 
been made and that technological feasibility of BMD systems is high” and that it “has 
been verified through the results of interception tests and various performance 
evaluations.”  Likewise, Fukuda’s statement attempted to deflect criticism that a BMD 
system would exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors by stating that it was “purely 
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defensive” and “meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense 
policy.”  He added that “it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring 
countries, and does not affect the regional stability.”120 
However, just as the government tried to overcome a handful of criticisms 
of BMD in its deployment announcement it continued to defer others.  The first major 
issue was the prohibition on collective self-defense.  Fukuda stated that BMD “aims at 
defending Japan” and “will be operated based on Japan’s independent judgment, and will 
not be used for the purpose of defending third countries.”   He further clarified this by 
saying Japan would intercept missiles “based on information on the target acquired by 
Japan’s own sensors.”  The technical aspects of this, as previously discussed, were not 
this clear and the effectiveness of Japanese BMD would be largely dependent on data 
provided by American systems.  Furthermore, Fukuda refused to make any comment on 
concerns related of the 1969 resolution on the peaceful use of space, saying that 
defending Japan generally fell under the Defense Operations Order in Armed Attack 
Situation and the specific issues surrounding BMD would be covered in later “specific 
studies.”121  Consequently, Fukuda’s statement deferred large and controversial aspects 
of BMD for later administrations to solve, but by deploying the system, the program 
gained even further policy momentum, making it harder to stop in later years. 
c.  The Diet 
The Diet, as it had before, continued to play a largely passive role.  Just as 
the public’s concerns over North Korea helped solidify the pro-BMD position of the JDA 
it also prompted the formation of a consensus in the Diet between the two largest parties, 
no doubt after they realized that opposition could have negative consequences at the 
polls.  Whereas the LDP had previously been relatively supportive of BMD it now 
became a strong advocate and became less concerned with cost, feasibility, or the impact 
on Chinese relations.  The most dramatic change, prompted by a desire to look like a 
party that could be entrusted with the nation’s defense, was the DPJ’s decision to support 
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BMD.  This left only the most left leaning groups in opposition.  Importantly, neither the 
LDP nor the DPJ attempted any significant modifications to the recommendations from 
the executive and the JDA, choosing instead to ignore the still unresolved issues 
surrounding BMD.122 
d.  Public Opinion and Debate 
While public opinion and policy debates are not directly related to the 
question posed by this thesis, they strongly affected the Diet, executive, and JDA and, 
consequently, should be briefly explained.  Two key characteristics stand out.  First, 
following the 1998 North Korean ballistic missile tests the public began to grow 
increasingly concerned about security, which only grew following Pyongyang’s 
successful nuclear test in 2002.  One poll, in March 2003, showed that “a 60.7 percent 
majority strongly felt insecure about Pyongyang’s missile launch and nuclear 
development, and 31.1 percent felt insecure to some extent.”123  As described above, this 
strong sense of insecurity would prove to be a strong motivator for the JDA and the Diet. 
Despite this deep anxiety about North Korea, there was almost no 
substantive public debate on BMD policies.  While there were numerous articles about 
what constituted BMD and plenty of editorials declaring this was a topic worthy of a 
national debate, coverage largely remained superficial.  Much of the reason for this, no 
doubt, was due to the highly technical nature of BMD, which made it hard for the general 
public to acquire sufficient expertise to fuel a debate.124  
The quality of the public debate was further hurt when the term BMD 
became virtually synonymous with Aegis BMD and the PAC-3 program was all but 
forgotten.  By focusing on Aegis BMD, which even in 2003 was several years from 
operational deployment, the government could claim that the important legal and 
constitutional questions surrounding missile defense could be deferred.  This ignored the 
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fact that the PAC-3 system that Japan had also decided to deploy already existed.125  
Consequently, whether the politicians and public were unclear or willfully ignoring this 
fact, they had essentially made a de facto decision to acquire a system of questionable 
legality. 
5.  January 2004 to Present: Legal Clarification and Accelerated 
Deployment 
Significant legal and constitutional issues remained even after the 2003 
deployment decision.  Furthermore, these issues had to be resolved rapidly since PAC-3 
was an existing system that just needed to be purchased.  Consequently, the Cabinet 
moved quickly, making the most important legal clarification in early 2004.  Later 
attempts at more comprehensive legal revisions, with the exception of the 2008 Basic 
Law on Space, were unsuccessful.126 
Interestingly, during this period, the executive appears to have played the most 
active role with the Diet largely remaining inert.  Some of the legal changes were 
certainly required by the bureaucracy in order to deploy a functional system, but this 
could not have occurred without the actions of the executive. 
a.  Subtle Reinterpretation of Collective Self-Defense 
Due to the fearful political climate incited by the North Korean missile 
and nuclear tests, Koizumi’s cabinet was able to implement a subtle yet vital 
reinterpretation of collective self-defense with hardly any political opposition.  In January 
2004, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) issued a decision regarding BMD that 
essentially stated that intent was the predominant factor in the legality of sharing 
information or intercepting missiles.  Under this ruling, the government of Japan 
acknowledged that its sensor data would be part of the American missile shield but held 
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that this was legal since the information was being provided only to bolster Japan’s 
defenses and not to support American military interventions.  This ruling also stated that 
Japan could intercept a missile if it had “a significant probability of hitting Japan,” which 
was perceived protect the JSDF if it was guilty of “inadvertently protecting the U.S. 
homeland from missile attack.” 127  This statement, most likely deliberately, stopped 
short on authorizing collective self-defense, but it significantly undermined previous 
definitions of it. 
Notably, this decision met with little opposition from the Diet.  Some 
members of the left raised objections but their inability to gain any traction demonstrates 
that the overwhelming majority in the Diet passively supported the reinterpretation.128  
Consequently, it appears likely that the Cabinet led the change to reinterpret collective 
self-defense with the JDA’s support and the Diet’s acquiescence.  Incidentally, the CLB’s 
cooperation may have been influenced by its public defeat in a previous struggle with 
Prime Minister Koizumi. During the legislative maneuvering that resulted in the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law, Koizumi was “lectured” by the head of the CLB.  
Koizumi “openly confronted the director general, who never lectured him again.”129  
Whether or not that informally subordinated the CLB to the Prime Minister is a question 
that deserves more comprehensive investigation. 
b.  Abe’s Failed Attempt to Permit Collective Self-Defense 
In the summer of 2006, Shinzo Abe succeeded Koizumi as Prime 
Minister.  Abe was well known for his nationalistic views and support for BMD.130  
Consequently, it should not be a surprise that his Cabinet led an effort to overturn the ban 
on collective self-defense.  This, of course, would be a monumental change in Japanese 
defense policy and unlike the subtle reinterpretation described above was guaranteed to 
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be politically difficult.  In order to lay the legal and political groundwork, Abe 
established the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security to study several 
constitutionally related defense issues including collective self-defense.  While Abe lead 
the 13-member council, he incorporated retired MOFA an MOD bureaucrats who could 
represent their ministries.  One of the four specific scenarios this Council was to study 
was whether Japan could use its BMD system to defend the United States itself.131  
Resolving this issue assumed increasing importance since the upgraded version of the 
SM-3 missile being developed for Aegis BMD would have significantly longer range, 
making it much more likely that JMSDF destroyers would be in a position to intercept 
missiles attacking America.132 
Domestic political concerns, largely independent of BMD, prematurely 
ended efforts to overturn the ban collective self-defense.  Following the LDP’s disastrous 
election loss in the Diet’s upper house, Prime Minister Abe resigned.  While his 
replacement, Yasuo Fukuda, was a supporter of BMD, he did not share Abe’s eagerness 
for tackling the legal and constitutional quagmire of Article 9 and collective self-defense.  
Consequently, he allowed the Council to file its final report but never took any action.133  
As a result, after a brief period of leadership on BMD the Prime Minister’s office once 
again returned to passivity.  Importantly, however, the program had moved forward to a 
point where significant political support was no longer needed.  The political leadership 
had provided sufficient room for the bureaucrats to implement the program requiring 
little more than approval of the annual budget through the standard political-bureaucratic 
processes.  Absent a concerted effort by politicians to terminate or transform the BMD 
program it could easily continue through operational deployment within its current 
political confines. 
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c.  The Rise of the DPJ 
Given the significant impact the rise of the DPJ has had on domestic 
politics and on other defense issues, namely Futenma, a brief word on its relationship 
with BMD is required.  Most notably, the DPJ appears to have chosen not to make BMD 
a political issue.  Furthermore, its senior leadership, including the now displaced Yukio 
Hatoyama and Ichiro Ozawa and current Prime Minister Naoto Kan, has supported BMD 
to varying degrees.134  In fact, the DPJ used support of BMD during the mid-2000s to 
demonstrate that it was a responsible party and ready for national leadership.  
Consequently, the likelihood of the DPJ trying to cancel or scale back BMD is low since 
doing so would make it look indecisive and hypocritical, both charges it is trying to 
defend against in the wake of the Futenma fiasco. 
Likewise, the DPJ has few incentives to expand the program.  Previous 
governments have either resolved or chosen to ignore all the major issues surrounding 
BMD with the exception of explicitly overturning the prohibition on collective self-
defense.  The likelihood that the DPJ would challenge this ban seems remote given its 
weakened political position and the volatility of the issue.  Consequently, the DPJ’s 
position appears analogous to Prime Minister Koizumi’s.  Barring an exogenous shock, 
furthering the BMD program incurs a reasonable amount of political risk with little 
political gain. Similarly, decreasing the program is politically hazardous.  Continuing 
with the previous government’s policies, however, will likely avoid political controversy.  
Consequently, despite the DPJ’s antipathy towards the LDP, BMD is one policy area 
where it will likely maintain the status quo. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the entire program, BMD has followed a remarkably consistent 
pattern between the Diet, the executive, and the bureaucracy.  This pattern has been 
generally consistent with the principal-agent model, demonstrated limited elements of the  
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plan-rational model, and highlighted shortcomings in both.  Furthermore, it indicates that 
foreign influences may have a far greater impact on defense policy formation than on the 
industrial and economic sectors. 
First, despite its apparent passivity, the Diet imposed implicit constraints on 
BMD.  Since the program’s inception, the Diet has never blocked any major expansion or 
denied funding to any significant degree.  Looking at this fact in isolation gives the false 
appearance that the Diet has not influenced the BMD program.  Importantly, however, 
every proposal that the executive and bureaucracy have made to the Diet has been 
carefully designed to not exceed perceived levels of legislative support.  Not 
coincidentally, the executive and bureaucracy pushed for major expansions to the BMD 
program only after exogenous shocks created an amenable political climate. 
 The bureaucracy and the executive settled into a cyclical pattern of alternating 
leadership.  In this cycle, the executive would expand the boundaries of the BMD 
program, within the implicit confines imposed by the Diet, and then turn it over to the 
defense bureaucracy.  The defense bureaucracy would then manage the program until it 
hit those limits, at which point it became dependent on the executive to secure another 
expansion from the Diet.  Fundamentally, the Diet established an implicit and somewhat 
nebulous upper boundary.  The executive would then establish an explicit limit somewhat 
below that.  Then the bureaucrats would take over and expand the program to the hard 
limit imposed by the executive.  Once the implicit boundary set by the Diet expanded, the 
executive was free to raise the explicit limit, and the cycle would repeat. 
Certain aspects of this pattern fit into the principal-agent and plan-rational 
models.  Supporting the principal-agent model is the bureaucracy’s inability to advance 
BMD without active participation from the executive and acquiescence from the Diet.  
Even when the bureaucracy had decided to pursue BMD before the political leadership, it 
still had to wait for the political leaders to grant legal authorization and funding.  
Consequently, the limits established by the executive and Diet served as inherent veto 




periodic reassessments.  At any of these reassessments, the executive could have simply 
taken no action and BMD would have foundered or the Diet could have refused to grant 
additional leeway or funding. 
Despite the apparent dominance of the political leadership, some aspects of the 
BMD program are more in line with the plan-rational model.  Like industrial policy, 
BMD is a complex program that is difficult to understand.  Consequently, gaining a 
strong background in the technical, legal, and international issues surrounding BMD 
requires extensive studying that few people are willing to undertake.  Not only did this 
contribute to the shallow nature of the debates surrounding BMD, but it created an 
opening for the bureaucracy to shape policy.  Since few politicians are defense policy 
experts in general and even fewer are BMD specialists, their ability to influence policy 
details is limited.  In effect, the JDA/MOD can tell the political leadership what the next 
step in BMD should be and then it becomes a yes or no vote.  Any efforts by politicians 
to choose some other point on the policy continuum can be easily thwarted through the 
presentation of technical and generally incomprehensible data.  By presenting these 
choices at times when the Diet’s hands were tied by popular opinion, the bureaucracy 
could profoundly shape how the BMD program unfolded. 
This interpretation, however, comes with an important caveat.  Just as the Diet 
had little choice but to support the bureaucracy’s proposals at these times, the bureaucrats 
were similarly constrained to advancing BMD only when public opinion was suitable.  
Essentially, the bureaucracy had to wait for international crises to produce an amenable 
domestic political atmosphere.  Consequently, bureaucrats were influencing how the 
BMD program grew but not when.  This may be better described as plan-rational light 
since the bureaucracy’s inability to control the pace and have the political leadership 
rubberstamp its proposals falls short of the ideal version of this theory.     
While both of these models explain aspects of the BMD program, they have little 
utility in others.  First, neither of these models adequately explains the relationship 
between the Diet and the executive.  Throughout the majority of the BMD program, the 
executive appeared hesitant to exceed what it perceived to be implicit limits set by the 
Diet.  Independently, this would indicate that the Diet held more power than the 
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executive, but other factors cast doubt on this.  First, the executive never made a 
sustained effort to expand the BMD program beyond what it thought the Diet would 
accept.  Consequently, neither the Diet nor the executive ever explicitly challenged the 
other regarding BMD policy so determining which would have prevailed is nothing more 
than speculation.  Second, concurrent with the decision to deploy BMD, the Koizumi 
Cabinet had also successfully pursued the Anti-Terrorism and Iraq Special Measures 
Laws.  Unlike BMD, however, these policies were clearly driven from the executive in a 
“top down” process.135  This indicates the 2001 governmental reforms did indeed 
strengthen the Cabinet and that Koizumi simply decided that BMD was not an issue he 
wanted to forcefully pursue. 
A further limitation of both policy formation theories is their inability to 
adequately explain the influence of external actors. Without a doubt, North Korea’s 
missile and nuclear tests were essential to furthering Japanese participation in BMD.  
Indeed, the major expansions in the BMD program followed North Koran provocations in 
1994, 1998, and 2002.  In fact, it would not be far off the mark to say the most important 
person in Japanese BMD policy is Kim Jong Il.  His government’s actions created a 
panicked public sentiment that called for something to be done.  What that something 
was, however, was never well defined.  Since BMD satisfied this need it became an easy 
program for politicians to support to prove to their constituents that they were taking 
action to protect the nation.  Indeed, the largest divergence from theories derived through 
economic and industrial policies may be the increased influence of foreign actions. 
In conclusion, power appears to be divided between the executive, Diet, and 
bureaucracy with each of the three filling a specific role.  Of these three, the bureaucracy 
is the weakest since it was dependent upon the political leadership to advance the BMD 
program.  The power relationship between the Diet and executive cannot be definitively 
determined from the information in this case study, but importantly, both seemed to base 
their support for BMD more heavily on public opinion than bureaucratic pressure.  
Consequently, the principal-agent model appears to have general utility when explaining 
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the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians, although it is not useful in 
explaining the interactions between politicians.  The plan-rational model, however, only 
explains limited aspects of these relationships and demands even more extensive caveats.  
This is especially significant since BMD is, in many ways, the ideal test case for this 
theory and its limited utility here casts doubt on how applicable it will be to cases that do 
not share so many characteristics with industrial and economic policy. 
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III. CASE STUDY: MARINE CORPS AIR STATION FUTENMA 
A. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE 
Few defense policies in Japan are as politically volatile as American basing on 
Okinawa.  This single issue combines complex domestic politics with some of the most 
tangible costs of the US-Japan alliance.  Of all the base problems, however, the relocation 
of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is the most controversial, even becoming 
one of the major causes for the resignation of Yukio Hatoyama, the first DPJ Prime 
Minister. 
Because of this volatility and the disastrous impact it had on the first DPJ Cabinet, 
Futenma provides a useful case study on defense policy formation.  First, it provides an 
example of how defense policy is made when it is on a high-profile and extremely 
contentious topic.  Second, and more importantly, it provides the most significant case 
study to date for how the new DPJ government has handled defense policy formation.  
Given the painful outcome, it is likely that the DPJ will change its processes; indeed, it 
has already done so to a degree, but major elements will likely remain.  Consequently, 
while the relocation of Futenma has been an ongoing issue for years, this case study will 
focus on the recent events since the DPJ’s assumption of power.  This will be especially 
useful since the DPJ does not play a prominent role in the other case study in this thesis. 
This case study is divided into three subsequent sections.  The first section 
provides background information explaining why Futenma is so politically incendiary 
and then summarizes the key decisions and agreements that occurred before the DPJ 
assumed power in late 2009.  The second section describes the DPJ’s actions regarding 
Futenma since its electoral victory.  This includes the party’s attempts to centralize 
policy-making authority in the cabinet at the expense of the bureaucracy and 
backbenchers and how these reforms affected the executive’s handling of Futenma.  This 
section ends with a description of the changes to the DPJ’s policy formation processes 
since the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama. The concluding section assesses the 
applicability of policy formation theories to the Futenma case study.  This section will 
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demonstrate that the plan-rational model has little utility in explaining defense policy 
formation under the DPJ.  Similarly, while the DPJ may be moving to a form of the 
principal-agent model, its mismanagement of Futenma undercuts one of the basic tenets 
of that theory, making any conclusions speculative.136 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Okinawa Basing and MCAS Futenma 
Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyu island chain, is less than one percent of 
Japan’s total landmass yet it hosts the bulk of United States Forces Japan (USFJ).  This 
includes naval port facilities at White Beach, the enormous Kadena Air Base, and 
numerous Army and Marine Corps posts.  All told, three-quarters of the American bases 
in Japan are located in Okinawa, occupying over one-fifth of the island’s land area.  
Additionally, two-thirds of the personnel assigned to USFJ call Okinawa home.  
Furthermore, the US forces are often difficult neighbors, conducting innumerable 
operations that are disruptive to the local-population from simply operating loud military 
aircraft to live-fire exercises.137 
For many Okinawans, Futenma is not only considered the most obtrusive base but 
also an unacceptable danger to the civilian population.  Surrounded by the city of 
Ginowan, even routine aircraft operations cause extensive noise disruptions to the 91,000 
inhabitants and a crash could easily kill or injure civilians.138  In fact, in 2004, a Marine 
Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion, a heavy lift helicopter, crashed into a building at the 
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Okinawa International University, only 300 meters from Futenma.  Fortunately, there 
were no fatalities and no one on the ground was injured but initial American refusals to 
allow the local police to inspect the crash site understandably angered Okinawans.139  
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, a component of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III 
MEF), is based at Futenma.140 
Complicating these problems are convoluted relationships between the United 
States government and military, the central Japanese government, the Okinawan 
prefectural and local governments, and the general population.  These policies and 
relationships are described at length in Kent Calder’s Embattled Garrisons.  In brief, 
however, the Japanese central government pays a significant amount of money in host 
nation support to defray the costs of American basing.  Most of this money pays for the 
infrastructure and operating costs of the bases (distinct from operating costs of the 
American military forces), including the salaries of Japanese citizens who work there.  A 
significant portion of it, however, is used in direct payments to Japanese citizens who 
shoulder the inconveniences of the bases.  This is particularly noticeable in Okinawa, 
where three-quarters of the land used by the US military is rented by the central Japanese 
government from Okinawan citizens who are the nominal landowners.141  The result is a 
convoluted domestic political situation rife with conflicting incentives. 
The political problems in Okinawa, however, are even deeper and more complex 
than American bases alone.  Other factors converge and in many ways American military 
basing is a rallying point for a confluence of grievances.  A major factor is the identity of 
Okinawans themselves, who have yet to come to a consensus on whether they are 
Japanese, something else entirely, or somewhere in between.142  Contributing to this is 
Okinawa’s unique historical legacy within Japan, having been the site of the largest battle 
between American and Japanese forces in the Pacific War.  While estimates vary, 
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approximately 150,000, or one in three, Okinawans lost their life as a result of the 
fighting, due to a combination of indiscriminate American tactics and Japanese brutality. 
After the war, even as Japan regained its sovereignty, Okinawa remained under American 
occupation and administered by the United States military until its reversion in 1972.143 
Complicating matters, Okinawa is the poorest prefecture in Japan with the highest 
unemployment rate and average incomes more than 20 percent below the national 
average. These combine with other factors like an incendiary local media to form a deep 
sense of victimization. 144 To some degree, American military basing touches on all these 
issues, virtually assuring it will be a perpetual flashpoint. 
2. The 1996 Agreement to Return Futenma  
Longstanding frustrations on Okinawa erupted in 1995 when three American 
service members abducted and brutally raped a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl.145  
Subsequent American actions, notably the long time it took to transfer the suspects into 
Japanese custody based on the status of forces agreement and insensitive comments made 
by the then Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command, only added to the outrage.146  
Okinawan anger suddenly had a focal point and became extremely well organized, 
resulting in a massive demonstration of 85,000 in Ginowan and other forms of protest.147 
This outpouring of anger prompted the Japanese and United States governments 
to begin negotiations to lessen the burden on Okinawa.  The public portion of this was the 
formation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).148  Unbeknownst even 
to SACO, however, the American and Japanese governments were conducting secret 
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high-level discussions.149  The result of these senior level talks was the February 1996 
agreement to return MCAS Futenma to Okinawa after a replacement facility had been 
built.150 
The decision to build a new base and return Futenma was made with little input 
from much of the Japanese government or local politicians.  The governor of Okinawa, 
Masahide Ota, learned of the deal as a fait accompli when Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto called him.  (Whether or not Ota agreed to the deal on this phone call became 
a point of contention in later years.).151  Similarly, the Vice Minister for the Okinawa 
Development Agency, Tetsuo Takikawa, said he was, “very surprised to hear the 
announcement while watching the televised joint press conference of Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador to JapanWalter Mondale.”152 
Even though the negotiations to return Futenma had been withheld from SACO, it 
soon fell to this committee to formulate plans for the replacement facility.153  Seven 
months after the announcement, the director of the JDA revealed a plan to build a sea-
based heliport in the harbor at Nago.  This met with swift and strong resistance in 
Okinawa, and the Nago city council formally objected.  Regardless of local opposition, 
however, in December, SACO endorsed the sea-based heliport in its “Final Report on 
Futenma Air Station.”154 
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3. The 2006 and 2009 Agreements 
The 1996 agreement to return Futenma in exchange for a replacement facility in 
Nago contained precious few details.  Reaching a more detailed agreement on the 
relocation would prove far more difficult than either side expected and the decision 
dragged for almost a decade. 
In late 2002 the United States and Japan initiated a study called the “Defense 
Policy Review Initiative” to analyze the roles and missions on which the alliance should 
focus.  Finally, after more than two years of negotiations, the Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Director General of the JDA and the American Secretaries of State 
and Defense jointly issued the “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for 
the Future.”155  That these discussions took so long was indicative of the contentiousness 
of several issues, especially basing, combined with poor management of the negotiating 
process by both sides.  For example, the Japanese bureaucracy seldom spoke with one 
voice as the various ministries and agencies clearly did not coordinate policy prior to 
entering negotiations.  Similarly, the United States foreign policy establishment was 
distracted by Iran, North Korea, and Iraq, leaving the American negotiators with 
insufficient support or attention from their own government.  Compounding this was the 
lack of high-level attention from either government unless the negotiations appeared on 
the brink of collapse.156 
These problems notwithstanding, this joint declaration outlined the main priorities 
of the alliance and included an extensive section on Futenma.  In essence, both sides 
agreed that maintaining a force of U.S. Marines on Okinawa allowed for “rapid crisis 
response” which was “a critical alliance capability,” although much of the III MEF would 
be relocated to Guam.  Those Marines remaining in Okinawa, however, must be 
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collocated with their helicopters to allow for adequate training.  Consequently, the 
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) had to remain in Okinawa.  This agreement stated 
that the FRF would be located at Camp Schwab and be built into Oura Bay.  Furthermore, 
it declared that pending the replacement of Futenma and the relocation of the Marines to 
Guam, the United States would be capable of consolidating its forces into fewer bases 
covering a smaller area and would then be able to “return significant land in the densely 
populated areas south of Kadena Air Base.157 
This agreement was not the end of the negotiations, however.  In May 2006, both 
states jointly released the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”  This 
statement covered much of the same ground as the previous year’s joint declaration but 
added more details.  Importantly, unlike the previous year’s statement that used vague 
language to link the FRF to land returns and moving Marines to Guam, the Roadmap 
added specificity.  Consequently, both the redeployment of the III MEF to Guam and the 
return of additional land became contingent upon “tangible progress toward completion 
of the FRF.”158 
Importantly, the 2006 Roadmap was not a formal international agreement but 
rather a joint statement.  It would take three more years before both governments 
formally accepted the realignment plan.  In April 2009 the LDP-controlled Lower House 
of the Diet approved the cumbersomely named “Agreement Between the Government of 
Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the 
Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and 
their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam.”   Significantly, this agreement passed the 
Lower House with LDP and Komeito support but failed in the DPJ- and SDPJ-controlled 
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Upper House.159  This did not prevent the ratification of the agreement, however, since 
passing the Lower House was sufficient according to the Japanese constitution.160 
Just a few months later, in September of 2009, the DPJ won a stunning electoral 
victory.  During the campaign, the DPJ had indicated that it might renegotiate the FRF 
agreement and would work towards becoming an equal to the United States within the 
security alliance.161  Additionally, the DPJ had promised to wrest power away from the 
bureaucracy and place it in the hands of politicians.162  These two priorities, as will be 
described in detail below, guided Prime Minister Hatoyama’s policies once he assumed 
power.  In doing so, he clearly demonstrated that governmental power lies with the 
politicians but also showed that ineptly handling the bureaucracy could result in dramatic 
failure.  The next section will describe how in the span of eight short months Prime 
Minister Hatoyama transitioned from bold statements about relocating Futenma to 
acquiescing to the original plan and promptly resigning. 
C. HATOYAMA POLICY FORMATION 
1. Election Promises 
The relocation of MCAS Futenma has certainly been an inflammatory political 
issue for years, but it did not necessarily need to be one for the new DPJ administration.  
This case study highlights how politicians can influence the political prominence of 
specific defense policies.  Unlike the BMD case study, where exogenous shocks were 
necessary to pull the matter out of apparent political neglect, Futenma was explicitly 
made an issue by the DPJ.  To be sure, national level debates and extremely vocal 
Okinawan participation had been part of the negotiation process, but once the LDP 
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government had agreed in 2009 to implement the relocation plan there were few practical 
reasons to make it a political issue and excellent justifications to ignore it.  The new DPJ 
government could have simply expressed self-righteous outrage but at the same time 
declared that once it became an official international agreement it could no longer be re-
negotiated.  Clearly, Hatoyama and the DPJ did not follow this course and they paid a 
high price. 
The roots of the DPJ’s decision to make Futenma a political issue and promise to 
move it off of Okinawa are unclear.  The DPJ had certainly indicated that it did not 
approve of the 2006 Roadmap or the subsequent ratification of that agreement.  Its 2009 
manifesto and public statements from the party’s leaders included vague language about 
changing the US-Japan security alliance into one of equals, but, importantly, stopped 
short of promising to move Futenma.163  Whether intentional or not, these statements 
were ambiguous enough that the DPJ could have fairly easily abandoned them as typical 
election pandering, declaring that it could not set aside an existing international 
agreement.  Amazingly, however, shortly after being elected, Hatoyama made Futenma 
the centerpiece of his administration.  The reasons for this are unknown (and likely 
regretted now) but some hypotheses have been made. These include an assumption by the 
DPJ that Futenma could be dealt with quickly through direct negotiations with President 
Obama or that it was trying to unequivocally demonstrate it was not the LDP in advance 
of the 2010 Upper House elections.164  Alternatively, Hatoyama may have been acting on 
his personal objection to the “extreme burden” that the American military presence places 
on the Okinawan people.165  Whether any combination of these particular reasons is 
accurate is irrelevant to the larger point that the Futenma crisis was manufactured by the 
Hatoyama administration, demonstrating that politicians can influence the political 
salience of specific defense policies. 
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Futenma, of course, was not the only issue for the DPJ but rather one of many.  
More broadly, the DPJ had promised to reform policy-making processes in Japan.  There 
were two sides to this.  First, it believed that the bureaucracy had too large a role in 
policy formation and its influence should be minimized.  Second, it wanted to concentrate 
policy-making power within the DPJ to the senior leadership and prevent backbenchers 
from exerting control.166 
The DPJ moved decisively to centralize power within the party to a select few 
senior politicians.  In practice, this largely meant Ichiro Ozawa, the party general-
secretary, Yukio Hatoyama, the party president and prime minister, and a few other key 
personnel who would form an “inner cabinet.”  To further this objective the Policy 
Research Council (PRC) was disbanded with policy formation responsibilities transferred 
largely to the Cabinet and Ozawa.167  Importantly, Ozawa, who was not a member of the 
Cabinet, concentrated party powers that are held by several people in the LDP.  His role 
in the party was largely as an enforcer, ensuring that backbenchers supported the 
executive’s policies.  This amount of power, however, also gave him significant influence 
within the Cabinet.  In effect, Ozawa was “the critical hinge between cabinet and ruling 
party, and between ruling party and Diet.”168 
These changes could not be implemented, however, without some cost.  
Analyzing and formulating policy requires an adequately sized and experienced staff.  
Unfortunately for the DPJ, neither of these characteristics could be met with this system, 
or, more broadly, with the personnel available to it in the Diet.  Many of the candidates 
who were elected in 2009 were relatively young and were running for office for the first 
time.169  Consequently, they had little policy formation experience and would have found 
it difficult to play any meaningful role even if there had been mechanisms in which they 
could participate.  Abolishing the PRC and concentrating power in the senior party 
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leadership, however, inhibited the party’s ability to take advantage of what experience or 
information existed within its membership in any formalized way. 
Without these policy formation weaknesses, the DPJ could have turned to the 
bureaucracy for support.  In fact, observers of Japan had noted that the DPJ would be 
particularly in need of assistance from a professional bureaucracy.170  Unfortunately for 
the DPJ, Hatoyama and Ozawa apparently believed even meeting with the bureaucracy 
clashed with their promise to exert political control.  Consequently, in September 2009, 
Japan elected a young inexperienced political party that lacked internal mechanisms to 
vet policy and would not even meet with meet with bureaucrats.  Not surprisingly, this 
rapidly resulted in incoherent policies that would cause the first DPJ Prime Minister to 
resign in less than a year. 
2. Bureaucratic Banishment 
Immediately after taking control of the government, the new DPJ administration 
set about asserting its control over the bureaucracy.  Perhaps the highest profile measure 
was abolishing the Administrative Vice Ministers meetings. This had the immediate 
effect of eliminating the bureaucracy’s ability to set the agenda for the Cabinet and did 
away with each Administrative Vice Minister’s de facto veto.  The DPJ also inhibited 
bureaucrats’ ability to sway public opinion by forbidding them to talk to the press without 
permission.  Furthermore, stringent limits were placed on meetings between 
backbenchers and bureaucrats, which severely weakened both groups’ ability to influence 
policy or subvert the Cabinet.171  If this was not clear enough already, Hatoyama drove 
these points home by his refusal to meet with senior bureaucrats.172  
These changes are illustrated by how Hatoyama’s administration conducted 
meetings involving the Foreign Ministry, where the traditional pattern of bureaucratic 
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domination with token political participation was more than reversed.  Under the new 
DPJ government, MOFA meetings included the “minister, senior vice ministers and 
parliamentary secretaries.”  Bureaucrats were not even allowed in the room.  Making this 
procedure even more unusual was an apparent prohibition on releasing minutes.  This 
resulted in lower level bureaucrats’ receiving verbal orders with little context as to how 
decisions were made or what the government’s objectives were.173 
These changes had profound implications regarding policy formation.  Most 
importantly, they provide unequivocal evidence that the executive can control the policy 
agenda despite objections from the bureaucracy.  Proving this point, however, came with 
a steep price.  Through these changes the DPJ had severed its information gathering 
mechanisms.  By using such draconian means to establish executive dominance, 
Hatoyama and his cabinet cut almost all their lines of communication with the other 
elements of the government.  While the LDP policy formation process had been 
cumbersome and filled with points where one person could effectively veto policy it also 
served to transfer information to the executive.  By abolishing the PRC but not providing 
any alternate information gathering process, the DPJ leadership lost an important tool and 
replaced it with a very informal, weak, and ad hoc system.  Furthermore, the basic 
function of any bureaucracy is to filter, analyze, and then push information to the 
decision makers in the government. Consequently, by excluding bureaucrats from policy 
formation, Hatoyama removed one of his most important information sources.174  The 
result was an executive that was making policy decisions in the dark without realizing 
many of its ideas had already been considered and discarded for good reason. 
3. Futenma Policy: Incoherent at Best, Incompetent at Worst 
Despite having made Futenma an issue, it soon became apparent that Hatoyama 
and the DPJ’s senior political leadership had no firm ideas about an alternate FRF except 
it should not be in Okinawa.  Consequently, the DPJ had to start from scratch and 
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appointed a committee that would decide on the government’s recommendation.  
Consistent with the DPJ’s stated goal of minimizing bureaucratic influence, this 
committee had several political appointees including the State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Koichi Takemasa, the Senior Vice Defense Minister, Kazuya Shimba, and the 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirofumi Hirano.  A few working-level bureaucrats were to 
assist the committee but their low level would have prevented them from exerting any 
significant influence.175 
Of course, deciding on a new location for the FRF was not exclusively a Japanese 
decision but also required the consent of the United States.  MOFA indicated to the DPJ 
leadership that it was prepared to have Ambassador, Ichiro Fujisaki, open negotiations 
with senior American diplomats in Washington, but this proposal was rejected.  Fearing 
that holding negotiations in the United States would allow America to control the pace 
and, quite possibly, mistrusting their own foreign service bureaucracy, the Cabinet chose 
to pursue the familiar “2+2” format.  Under this plan Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada 
and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa would negotiate directly with their American 
counterparts.176 
Making this entire plan even more difficult was the unrealistic timeline.  Shortly 
after assuming office, Prime Minister Hatoyama announced that the Japanese government 
would resolve the FRF issue by the end of May, less than eight months after the election.  
This pronouncement borders on the ridiculous.  Even the LDP, which the DPJ accused of 
being too accommodating to the United States, took well over a decade to negotiate an 
agreement about Futenma.  How the DPJ thought it could throw out the previous 
agreement and renegotiate a replacement in eight short months is incomprehensible.  
Furthermore, negotiations require the active cooperation of both participants.  If one of 
the parties will not even discuss the issue then negotiations are doomed from the start.  
Consequently, the DPJ timeline was almost entirely dependent on an actor it could not 
control.  Not only was this an unrealistic promise, but it was a promise that the DPJ had 
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no power to complete unilaterally. Consequently, when the United States bluntly rebuffed 
the Hatoyama Cabinet’s attempts at renegotiating, its promises were shown to be 
hollow.177 
In addition to the United States, Hatoyama would have to convince his own 
supporters, especially on Okinawa, to accept a new plan.178  For many Okinawans, the 
only acceptable solution was removing Futenma from the island. Promising this, 
however, was a significant mistake on Hatoyama’s part since removing the base would be 
virtually impossible due to American resistance.  This raised Okinawans’ expectations 
beyond what could be reasonably achieved so almost any compromise with the United 
States would be seen as a broken promise.  The fact that he did this is more remarkable 
since he did not have an alternate site ready to take the FRF nor an idea of where to put it. 
Hatoyama effectively boxed himself into a corner by making promises he was 
largely powerless to deliver.  In order to succeed, he needed the United States 
government to discard close to 15 years of negotiations and accept a different FRF, and 
an undetermined place in Japan would need to agree to host a new American base.  All 
this had to be done in less than eight months. 
Despite the mounting evidence that this plan was not going to work, Hatoyama 
did not amend his government’s policy formation processes.  His unwillingness to engage 
with the bureaucracy was highlighted by his proposal to build the FRF at Tokunoshima.  
In an interview after his resignation, Hatoyama admitted that this alternative was a 
recommendation by a junior Diet member and that the Cabinet did not inform the 
bureaucracy before announcing it.  If he had ordered the bureaucracy to analyze 
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already been studied and rejected by both the American and Japanese governments.179  
Hatoyama had seemingly mistaken requesting information from bureaucrats for 
permitting excessive influence. 
Exacerbating Hatoyama’s problems was his choice of Chief Cabinet Secretary.  
As the most powerful position in the executive aside from the Prime Minister, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary is a powerful person, or more precisely, has the tools to be powerful.  
Hirofumi Hirano, however, lacked experience, having only served in party leadership 
positions and never in government.  Considered one of Hatoyama’s most loyal advisors, 
many observers believed that “Hirano’s sole credential for the job is his close ties” with 
the Prime Minister.180 
Symptomatic of his lack of qualifications, Hirano did not adequately fulfill his 
obligations as the Chief Cabinet Secretary.  Most importantly, he exerted little influence 
in his role of coordinating government wide policy and only met a handful of senior 
bureaucrats. This was no doubt exacerbated by an apparent sluggishness in taking 
ownership of the Futenma issue despite the fact that he was the government official 
tasked with leading the relocation efforts. In fact, among the many jobs of the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, the only one he seemed to embrace was that of spokesman, but even in 
that role, he was prone to gaffes and embarrassments. 181 
On top of this, Hatoyama seemed incapable of controlling his own cabinet.  While 
he and Ozawa had expended considerable effort in successfully minimizing the influence 
of junior members of their own party, they were far less successful in doing so with the 
senior leadership.  Throughout the entire process, members of the Cabinet expressed 
contradictory views.  Consequently, the United States government never really knew 
what the Japanese government wanted, and the Japanese public was similarly confused.   
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The public’s perception was especially damaging and was succinctly captured by Masaru 
Kaneko, a Japanese economist, when he said, “It’s like amateurs driving Formula One 
cars.”182 
The bureaucracy’s response to the DPJ’s Futenma initiatives is still not clear.  
There were signs that the bureaucracy was willing to accept the policies of the DPJ and 
be constructive partners in the process.  This seems particularly true at MOFA, where the 
bureaucracy indicated its willingness to initiate negotiations with the United States, 
despite its opposition to inciting an international disagreement.183  Contradicting these 
positive indications, other elements of the bureaucracy, even within MOFA, have been 
less helpful.  For example, some members of the foreign ministry deflected orders to find 
an alternate FRF with the claim that the MOD was the responsible bureaucracy.  
Additionally, MOFA appears to have put forth little effort to arrange a meeting between 
Hatoyama and Obama for fear that the Futenma issue would become even more 
difficult.184  These contradictory actions are likely indicative of a bureaucracy that was 
unsure about how to respond to the new policy procedures of the DPJ.  While some 
resistance should be expected from elements within the bureaucracy, this may have been 
more pronounced than necessary due to the disorganization within the Hatoyama Cabinet. 
Unfortunately, this confusion in the executive allows for conflicting but equally 
plausible explanations for the bureaucracy’s actions.  On the one hand, bureaucrats may 
have been passive because they knew the United States would not renegotiate the FRF 
and it was only a matter of time before the policy initiative failed.  On the other hand, 
bureaucrats may have been uninvolved or taken contradictory actions because the 
executive was providing mixed signals.  The conflicting efforts of the bureaucrats could 
conceivably have been good faith efforts to implement contradictory desires from the 
executive.  Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the bureaucracy is not a 
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monolith, nor are the individual ministries.  Just as the BMD case study indicated, each 
ministry may contain proponents of certain policies who are fighting for dominance.  The 
confusion in the Cabinet would have provided more room for these conflicts and may 
have effectively invited contradictory actions between and within the ministries. 
4. A Resigned Hatoyama Resigns; DPJ Attempts Reforms 
By the end of May, it became obvious, even to Prime Minister Hatoyama, that the 
government would be unable to negotiate a new FRF plan.  Consequently, he announced 
that he would accept the LDP agreement made the previous year and then resigned as 
Prime Minister and President of the DPJ just five days later.  Editorials after his 
resignation captured the mood of many Japanese with phrases describing Hatoyama’s 
leadership as “waffling and dithering” and stating that his “political responsibility for this 
fiasco is unlimited.”185 
Much of the blame was related to the government’s inept attempts to control the 
bureaucracy.  An editorial in Asahi stated that, “Its campaign to ensure lawmakers’ 
leadership in policymaking [sic] has backfired because of its inability to make effective 
use of bureaucrats.”186  Similarly, the Japan Times opined that, “Mr. Hatoyama’s 
handling of the Futenma issue showed his artlessness in utilizing the expertise of the 
bureaucracy and his inability to make the preparations needed to resolve a delicate 
issue.”187 
To counter these perceptions, the new Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, has taken 
several steps to reform the broken policy formation process.  First, Kan toned down the 
anti-bureaucratic rhetoric by getting rid of slogans like, “From dependency on the 
bureaucracy toward a politician-led government,”188 in an effort to gain credibility for his 
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claim to simply want “post-bureaucratic politics, not anti-bureaucratic politics.”189  In 
addition to eliminating slogans, which is fairly easy to do, he has attempted to reopen 
communication with the bureaucracy by hiring more aides from the civil service.190  
Likewise, the DPJ is trying to rebuild its internal policy-making procedures, most notably 
by reestablishing the PRC.  The reconstituted PRC is intended, however, to promote two-
way communication within the DPJ and not to shift power away from the cabinet.  Since 
Prime Minister Kan will likely continue to prohibit contact between bureaucrats and 
backbenchers, the PRC’s ability to subvert the cabinet will remain limited.  Furthermore, 
Kan has appointed a member of the Cabinet to head the PRC, providing incentives for it 
to support the executive.191 
D. CONCLUSION 
Futenma provides tentative indications for how a DPJ led government will create 
defense policies, but it is only a single instance of policy formation.  It is, however, the 
only complete defense-related case study under a party that has never governed before.  
This, paradoxically, is both the reason Futenma is worth examining and the reason any 
conclusions drawn from it are preliminary. 
Compounding the problems inherent in using a single case, the DPJ, under Prime 
Minister Kan, has been attempting to correct the weaknesses associated with policy 
formation under his predecessor.  It has already begun forging new connections with the 
bureaucracy and the party’s own backbenchers.  Furthermore, the evidence that exists on 
the bureaucracy’s response to the DPJ is limited and contradictory and, unfortunately, 
focuses on MOFA and not MOD. 
Despite these limitations, Futenma is still relevant.  First, even with the political 
disaster that this issue brought upon Prime Minister Hatoyama, the DPJ has shown no 
                                                 
189 Tobias Harris, Japan: The DPJ faces the bureaucracy, June 25, 2009, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/25/japan-the-dpj-faces-the-bureaucracy/ (accessed July 31, 2010). 
190 Tanaka, “Hatoyama’s.” 
191 Tobias Harris, The Kan System, June 9, 2010, 
http://www.observingjapan.com/search/label/politician-bureaucrat%20relationship (accessed September 
10, 2010). 
 71
signs of reverting to a bottom-up style of governance.  Indeed, the changes in policy 
formation procedures that Prime Minister Kan has imposed appear intended to create a 
more effective top-down style of governance instead of what can arguably be described 
as Hatoyama’s top-only approach.  Second, this case has clearly demonstrated that the 
political leadership, at a minimum, is capable of setting its own agenda on defense issues 
regardless of the bureaucracy’s wishes. 
With these important considerations in mind, Futenma can still be used to assess 
the applicability of existing policy formation theories in the defense realm.  To begin, the 
plan-rational model does not appear to have significant utility.  At most, the bureaucracy 
was able to subvert the executive’s plans through inaction.  By simply not being pro-
active the government bureaucrats would have made policy implementation more 
difficult for the Cabinet.  Simply hindering policy, however, is a far cry from the 
bureaucrat-led model advocated by Chalmers Johnson.  While clumsy and heavy-handed, 
the DPJ undercut bureaucratic authority and influence by refusing to even meet with the 
civil service.  This relegated the bureaucracy to a subservient role, where the most it 
could do was refuse to provide support to the political leadership in the hopes that the 
DPJ would fail on its own.  Not assisting the political leadership in the hopes that its own 
bumbling will be ineffective, however, is not the sign of a strong bureaucracy that guides 
the nation’s policies.  This conclusion, however, should not be surprising since the 
political sensitivity surrounding Futenma is dissimilar to industrial policy.  In fact, 
Futenma is so inflammatory that it may inherently be a policy area that is dominated by 
politicians, just as Johnson acknowledged was the case in agriculture and education. 
The principal-agent model cannot be as easily discarded but this case study cannot 
prove its adequacy either.  At its core, the principal-agent model assumes that the 
bureaucracy understands the objectives of the political leadership and that the latter is so 
powerful the former acquiesces.  The DPJ, however, failed to make its intentions clear to 
the bureaucracy.  This occurred in numerous ways, such as relying on verbal instructions 
to bureaucrats and various ministers’ publicly announcing contradictory policies.  As a 
result, it is quite likely that the bureaucracy had no clear guidance beyond moving the 
FRF somewhere other than Okinawa.  With that lack of clarity, it is not surprising that 
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different elements of the bureaucracy seemed to pursue contradictory goals.   
Consequently, despite the DPJ’s success at controlling the agenda of the policy debate, its 
failure to even communicate with the bureaucracy precludes an accurate test of the 
principal-agent model.  Importantly, however, this is not necessarily a fatal flaw in 
applying the principal-agent model to the DPJ and its relationship with the bureaucracy.  
Presuming the DPJ can resolve its internal policy processes and settle on clear guidance 
for the bureaucracy, the principal-agent model may prove to have significant explanatory 
power. 
This begs the question of just what model describes Japanese defense policy 
formation under the DPJ.  While one case study is too small a sample to draw conclusive 
answers, Futenma indicates the DPJ may be making progress towards its objective of a 
Westminster-style parliamentary system.  Even if the bureaucrats had been privately 
subverting the executive, the fact remains that the Cabinet set the agenda.  This 
demonstrates that the bureaucracy can no longer achieve Chalmers Johnson’s ideal of 
guiding policy, but, at most, can only hinder its implementation. Furthermore, while the 
PRC is being reconstituted, without contact with the bureaucrats it will struggle to 
become an independent source of power within the DPJ, forcing the backbenchers into a 
subordinate position to the Cabinet.  The reasons a Westminster-style system are not 
more obvious could conceivably be due to the mismanagement of the Hatoyama cabinet.  
Had he chosen an issue that did not require the United States’ acquiescence and had he 
coaxed or coerced his cabinet to speak with one voice, he may very well have had a 
different outcome and still be serving as prime minister. 
In conclusion, while it is too soon to tell, Futenma may portend a new form of 
defense policy formation.  This may take the form of a Westminster-style system (a 
principal-agent model itself) or some variation of Japan’s traditional processes.  What is 
more certain, however, is the executive has decisively demonstrated that it can control the 
policy-making agenda when it desires and that the bureaucracy, at most, can only hinder 
initiatives but cannot create ones themselves. 
 73
IV. CONCLUSION 
Considerable analytic effort has been expended on how Japan creates economic 
and industrial policies but the defense sector has largely been ignored.  The policy 
formation models resulting from the economic and industrial fields, however, cannot 
simply be extended to national security without carefully determining if they are 
applicable.  This requires assessing the adequacy of these theories against a 
comprehensive set of defense policies.  Of course, this far exceeds the possible scope of a 
single thesis, but analyzing one narrow aspect of this question is possible.  Consequently, 
this thesis examined how politicians and bureaucrats interact while making defense 
policy and then analyzed how well their behavior can be explained by existing policy 
formation theories.  While definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from only two case 
studies, the ones presented here are helpful in providing indications about whether or not 
these theories are applicable, require revisions, or need to be discarded.  In short, these 
case studies demonstrate that the bureaucrat-centered plan-rational model has extremely 
limited applicability but the politician-centered principal-agent model possesses a 
reasonable amount of explanatory power, although it requires several revisions. 
Surprisingly, the plan-rational model is insufficient at explaining even the BMD 
case study.  This is especially notable since the BMD program shares so many 
characteristics with the industrial and economic policies from which the plan-rational 
theory was developed.  For example, like many industrial policies, BMD never incited 
strong public controversy and is technically complicated, requiring significant specialized 
knowledge.  Despite these shared characteristics, however, bureaucrats were unable to 
advance the program on their desired schedule.  Instead, the program only expanded 
when international crises created an atmosphere in which supporting BMD was 
advantageous to politicians.  While it is possible that the program just happened to reach 
points that required legislative expansion only in the wake of North Korean provocations, 
what is far more likely is that bureaucrats held deep-seated reservations about their ability 
to convince the Diet to advance BMD so they waited for an amenable political climate.   
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This strongly indicates that bureaucrats could not get the Diet to simply rubberstamp their 
BMD proposals and were effectively dependent on external actors to establish the 
conditions in which program could expand. 
Importantly, these characteristics of the BMD program not only critique the plan-
rational model but point to the applicability of the principal-agent theory.  Inherent in the 
bureaucracy’s unwillingness to advance policies that it could not push through the Diet is 
an implicit understanding of what the political leadership was willing to support.  
Furthermore, the Diet and executive’s decision to incrementally expand the program can 
be seen as maintaining an implicit veto.  In essence, politicians would delegate a certain 
amount of authority to the bureaucracy but periodic reassessments were required to 
expand those bounds.  Structurally, this gave the political leadership the upper hand 
because it could effectively choose to constrain the BMD program through inaction 
whereas the bureaucracy had to push for its goals.  If the plan-rational model were in 
effect, the reverse should be expected.  Essentially, the political leadership would have 
granted the bureaucracy wide, if not absolute, latitude in pursuing the program, either 
implicitly or explicitly, and politicians would have been required to take action to alter 
the program’s progress. 
Like BMD, Futenma undermines the plan-rational model and supports the 
applicability of the principal-agent theory.  In this case, not only were the bureaucrats 
unable to create policy, but they were excluded from the entire process, including its 
management.  Certainly, Futenma, with its highly controversial and public characteristics, 
is not an ideal test case for the plan-rational model, but if this theory were to have wide 
applicability, some characteristics of it should still be present.  Instead, this case appears 
to more closely resemble agriculture and education policies in which politicians control 
bureaucrats.  Two factors likely contribute to this.  First, the governmental reforms that 
went into effect in 2001 gave the prime minister and the cabinet more explicit tools for 
controlling the bureaucracy.  More importantly, however, are the DPJ’s efforts to reign in 
the bureaucracy’s influence through measures like abolishing the administrative vice 
ministers meetings and prohibiting bureaucrats from meeting with members of the Diet.  
These factors combined to create a bureaucracy that was, at most, only able to frustrate 
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the DPJ’s efforts through passivity or possibly some extremely limited and veiled 
obstruction.  This is not evidence, however, supporting the plan-rational model, which 
assigns the ability to formulate and implement policy to bureaucrats, not just hinder it. 
Just as in the BMD case, the evidence against the plan-rational model supports the 
principal-agent theory.  Clearly, the DPJ minimized the bureaucracy’s ability to establish 
the agenda regarding Futenma and concentrated that power in the Cabinet.  Furthermore 
as supported by admittedly limited evidence, the bureaucracy’s response was mixed, with 
some elements attempting to assist the DPJ and others providing passive resistance. This 
should be expected, however, since the bureaucracy is not a monolith and different 
elements, even under the LDP, often pursued divergent courses.  Additionally, the 
confusion and indecision displayed by Hatoyama and his Cabinet could have easily 
contributed to the bureaucracy’s inconsistent actions.  While divided political leadership 
is not specifically addressed in the plan-rational model, the bureaucracy’s response to it 
better fits a system where bureaucrats are subordinate to politicians.  With contradictory 
guidance emanating from the executive, combined with a new party that had never held 
power and little direct communication from the prime minister or his principal advisors, 
even a fully subordinated bureaucracy should be expected to take conflicting actions or 
simply stop taking action at all until it knows what is required of it.  Significantly, 
however, this implies that if the DPJ can resolve its internal problems and speak with one 
voice the bureaucracy can be expected to follow. 
Importantly, neither theory adequately explains the relationship between the 
executive, defined by the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and selected aides, on the one hand, 
and the Diet and majority party on the other.  In the BMD case study, for example, the 
executive’s unwillingness to pursue policies that exceeded perceived legislative support 
indicates that the Diet was the more powerful of the two.  Before extrapolating any 
conclusions from this, however, it is important to remember that the executive 
successfully pushed other national security policies, such as the Anti-Terrorism and Iraq 
Special Measures Laws, through the Diet despite strong opposition.  Furthermore, the 
Futenma case study clearly shows that a top-heavy party structure that concentrates 
power in a few key members allows even a bumbling but determined executive to 
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dominate the ruling party and Diet.  The evidence available in these two case studies on 
the relationship between different groups of politicians can only support the observation 
that power is shared between the executive and the ruling party and Diet and that the 
balance can shift widely between the two.  The most pronounced reason for these shifts is 
likely the executive’s level of interest in a certain policy.  This would explain the 
contradiction during the Koizumi Cabinet of allowing the Diet to dictate the parameters 
of the BMD program while simultaneously pushing for other controversial defense 
policies.  Likewise, it partly explains why Futenma became a high-profile political issue 
after the DPJ came to power but BMD did not.  The structure of the ruling party may be a 
factor as well but is likely secondary to the executive’s objectives and willingness to 
pursue a given policy, since examples exist even under the bottom-up LDP of prime 
minister’s pushing unpopular defense policies. 
In addition to refining the relationships between politicians, a more accurate 
defense policy formation model would also need to incorporate other defense-specific 
factors.  These case studies indicate at least three additional influences - American 
pressure, exogenous shocks, and public opinion - that affect defense policy differently 
than its economic and industrial counterparts.  All three of these impact the executive, the 
Diet and party, and the bureaucracy to varying degrees and potentially can change their 
relative strengths. 
First, American influence clearly affects Japanese policy.  This includes overt 
pressure, like refusing to renegotiate Futenma’s relocation, to more subtle forms that 
affect how policy makers frame issues, like the JDA bureaucrats’ contention that Japan 
should pursue BMD just to strengthen the alliance.  Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
assume that American influence on defense policy will be greater than its impact on the 
industrial and economic areas.  Since industrial and economic policy involve all of 
Japan’s trading partners, the United States is reduced to just one voice in the crowd, 
albeit a very loud and insistent one.  The United States is Japan’s only military ally, 
however, which gives Tokyo fewer alternatives if it does not share Washington’s policy 
goals.  The magnitude of America’s influence is likely the most variable regarding 
Japanese politicians.  Many Japanese bureaucrats already are strongly pro-American, as 
 77
evidenced by their support for BMD and hesitancy at renegotiating Futenma, and believe 
it is important to keep the United States satisfied with the alliance.  Politicians, however, 
are not necessarily such strong supporters.  In fact, the DPJ has accused the LDP of being 
too willing to accommodate American pressure and has already demonstrated its 
willingness to challenge the United States.  Consequently, the ability of the United States 
to influence Japanese politicians will likely vary across party lines. 
Second, advancing defense programs may be more dependent on exogenous 
shocks than industrial policy.  Every major expansion of the BMD program, for example, 
was a result of provocative North Korean activity.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine the 
executive or the Diet mustering the political will to fund BMD, much less tackle the 
constitutional questions surrounding it, had North Korea not fired several ballistic 
missiles towards Japan and tested a nuclear device.  Consequently, moving defense 
policies beyond the status quo, at least those that are costly or impact sensitive 
constitutional questions, may only be possible if external actors provoke sufficient 
insecurity within the Japanese public and government.  This factor likely exerts similar 
levels of influence on both bureaucrats and politicians and prompts them to move in the 
same policy direction. 
Third, closely related to the impact of exogenous shocks is public opinion.  Not 
only are politicians understandably attuned to public sentiment, but the MOD, likely due 
to the sensitivity of defense issues, appears to be more responsive to it than METI and 
MOF.  In fact, the public outcry after North Korea fired a missile over Japan was one of 
the factors that convinced BMD detractors in the JDA to support the program, even in 
defiance to their own parochial interests.  If public opinion consistently trumps 
bureaucratically entrenched interests, then it will be an important factor to consider in 
defense policy formation models. 
In conclusion, elements of existing policy formation theories are suitable for the 
defense sector.  Specifically, the principal-agent model appears to be generally applicable 
to the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, although it is inadequate at 
explaining the interactions between politicians.  The plan-rational model, however, 
appears to have extremely limited utility.  The fact that it can only provide minimal 
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explanations in an ideal test case indicates that it will be even less beneficial across the 
range of defense policies.  Consequently, despite its weaknesses, the principal-agent 
theory has the potential to be refined into an accurate defense policy formation model. 
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